Part I examines the issue of the relationship between the duress defense and that of necessity. The author criticizes both the traditional way of distinguishing the two, by reference to the source of the pressure on the defendant to violate the law, as well as attempts to assimilate one to the other. The central contention is that duress constitutes a defense independent of necessity because, unlike the latter, it impugns the defendant's culpability without implying that his act was socially desirable. Whether this means that it should be classified as an excuse (the dominant contemporary view) is explored in Part II. This section of the paper critically analyzes some recent attempts to demonstrate not only that duress should not be understood in this way, but also that it cannot be accommodated by any of the categories in the traditional classification scheme for criminal law defenses. In the concluding section, the author offers his own account of how duress functions to remove culpability, an account he believes has some significant advantages over alternative proposals. 64 notes