The author uses the term "problematizing" to refer to a lack of clarity and the presence of ambiguity in specifying what constitutes organizational crime. He argues that the ambiguities and conflicts in defining what constitutes organizational crime should not be obliterated by precise definitions that inevitably exclude organizational injurious actions. He prefers a repertoire of definitions that together encompass a broad range of organizations and organizational behavior. He argues that it is possible for scholars who adopt this position to accept the considerable consensus that most criminal laws are appropriate as revealed in the public opinion survey literature. Still, interpretations of particular applications of a criminal law will always occasion debate and disagreement about the kinds of behavior proscribed in the law. The author suggests, however, that it is still best to rely essentially on the definitional work of legislatures and the interpretive work of judges and juries in deciding what is organizational crime. The law-making of legislatures and the interpretive work of judges and juries should locate that consensual core area of the criminal law that is unchanging. Such an endeavor becomes the launching point for facing the challenge of operationalizing white-collar crime in a way that will generate a cumulative body of positive social science data that can be used to build theories of organizational crime. The role of civil adjudication in forging conceptions of organizational crime is also discussed, along with the implications of the author's argument for qualitative criminological research methods. 59 references