The international arena has been viewed as the source of pressure, analysis, and proposed solutions to the globally relevant issue of organized crime and the contributor to Greece’s political response to the issue of organized crime. However, it is impossible to understand how Greek policy against organized crime has been generated without taking into account the gains hoped for both domestically and internationally by the section of the Greek policymaking elite that has pursued an anti-organized crime policy. This paper uses the theoretical framework on international norm diffusion, (developed by Ikenberry and Kupchan) to analyze the development of an organized crime policy in Greece. This international norm diffusion is situated in a discussion of the use of socializing practices to strengthen and extend hegemony in international relations. The value of this framework is that it explains how pressure from international actors can combine with a domestic legitimacy issue to form a determining context for preference formulation amongst the state’s policymaking elite in their interaction with a new international norm. This enables an analysis of policy development to address the motivations behind policymaking that go beyond domestic causal factors. This paper treats this framework backwards. The paper describes the problem of a widespread negative societal response to state efforts to harmonize domestic policy with international cooperation against organized crime. The paper addresses the pressures exerted on Greece from the international arena, arguing that they have also provided crucial incentives for elite preference-formulation in producing anti-organized crime policy. 114 Notes