"Agroterrorism" refers to terrorist attacks that attempt to cause death and illness by contaminating food sources for large segments of a population. Unlike in the United States, where studies have been undertaken to address this threat, Australian authorities have continued to focus on the accidental introduction of foreign diseases as the most likely form of a biological threat to Australia's population. Three broad policy options are recommended. First, Australian authorities must improve their identification and control of the movement of dangerous pathogens between Southeast Asia and Australia. Such a program would provide accounting controls over stocks of dangerous pathogens in veterinary hospitals, research laboratories, and universities. Second, Australia must improve information-sharing among national intelligence agencies, State government agencies, and first-responders. Third, Australia must work closely with other intelligence agencies in Southeast Asia and globally to profile individual terrorists and groups that show an interest in acquiring and using biological weapons. Contributing to the attractiveness of an agroterrorist attack in Australia is the changing nature of the country's agribusiness. Consolidation of holdings, intensive animal rearing practices, the openness of farms, and the distances over which livestock travel in relatively short time periods make outbreaks of infectious disease, whether by intent or accident, more likely. The lower capability requirements for an agroterrorist attack also attract terrorists. 72 notes