Although these two types of deviance are distinctly different, both types of behaviors stemmed not only from the failure of the relevant organizations to monitor, prevent, and punish deviant behavior, but also from the organization's creation and implementation of formal structures that made deviant behavior predictable and even an ingredient of organizational "success." The procedure by which an organization's formal statements of how and why specified procedures that should be followed are not implemented in practice is called "decoupling" in this article. In decoupled organizations, flexibility--which includes a willingness to violate formal rules in order to achieve organizational goals--is a valued quality among workers. Thus, if the function of prisoner management and interrogation in Abu Ghraib was to elicit useful information from inmates, then how this was done, even if it violated formal policies, was not so important as achieving results. "Neo-institutional" theory offers a general framework in which organizations are viewed as contexts in which behaviors in pursuit of or derived from organizational goals emerge. Deviance emerges from the contradictions faced by organizations in attempting to promote ethical behaviors for pursuing organizational goals while giving ultimate priority to maximizing the achievement of organizational goals. These conflicting norms shape organizational structures under the influence of upper level actors whose advancement rests primarily on achieving organizational goals. This article examines the tenets of neo-institutional theory in analyzing the deviant behaviors at the Abu Ghraib prison and the falsification of architectural internship reports by architects in training in the United States. 5 notes and 65 references