The study found that households which persisted in growing poppy for opium in these Provinces did not have a consistent predisposition to favor this crop or an inherent tendency toward illegality. In Ghor, farmers who continued to cultivate opium poppy did so because they did not have livestock in which to invest, and they increasingly had fewer nonfarm income opportunities both within the Province and across the border in Iran. In Nangarhar, those with better access to resources, as well as greater proximity to the labor and agricultural commodity markets of Jalalabad and Kabul, refrained from opium poppy cultivation; it was those with fewer assets and greater distance to markets who continued to cultivate the crop. These findings indicate the need for caution when interpreting data on opium poppy cultivation. Specifically, analysts must be careful in attributing levels of opium poppy cultivation to the “political commitment” of the local authorities. This narrow focus tends to overlook the wider socioeconomic, political, and environmental conditions that influence both opium production and the broader livelihood strategies within which the motivation for opium poppy cultivation occurs. There is a need for more disaggregated data if the Afghanistan Government and the international community are to develop a better understanding of the nature of the transition from illegal to legal livelihoods; how this differs by time, location, and socioeconomic group; and the tools that are most likely to produce improvements in economic growth, security, and governance that are linked to sustained reductions in opium poppy cultivation. The study methodology is described. 4 tables, photographic illustrations, and a 21-item bibliography