The unfolding market crisis reveals evasions of regulatory controls and frauds that were less visible in buoyant markets. International networking of regulators and those they regulated resulted in convergence of regulatory standards - and creation of common 'blind spots' - corresponding to private-sector assumptions, 'models', data, and mood. Moving forward, this paper suggests that the literature on security governance can be used to reframe market regulation. Going against calls for a tightening of convergence between regulatory regimes, the paper argues for regulatory diversity as a means for reducing market 'herding' and the consequent systemic risks. Regulatory diversity would correspond to a political strategy of democratic steering of regulatory agencies, diluting, if not displacing, the currently dominant notion of financial market regulation as a purely 'technical' discourse. In concrete terms, this implies shifting systemic regulatory oversight responsibilities away from 'independent' agencies to government bodies and/or departments that are held accountable to their parliaments and electorates. References (Published Abstract)