IT HELD THAT UNDER A SYSTEM OF JURY-DISCRETIONARY CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, A VENIREMAN MAY NOT BE EXCLUDED FOR CAUSE BECAUSE OF HIS VIEWS ON THE DEATH PENALTY, UNLESS HIS VIEWS ARE UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR AND WOULD COMPEL HIM TO VOTE AUTOMATICALLY AGAINST IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY OR WOULD PREVENT HIM FROM MAKING THE REQUIRED IMPARTIAL DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE. IN FURMAN V. GEORGIA (1972), THE COURT INVALIDATED ALL DEATH SENTENCES IMPOSED PURSUANT TO A SYSTEM OF JURY-DISCRETIONARY CAPITAL PUNISHMENT BECAUSE OF ITS PERCEPTION THAT THE PREVAILING SYSTEM RESULTED IN AN ARBITRARY AND UNEVEN APPLICATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. THIS ARTICLE ANALYZES POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS ON THE TWO CATEGORIES OF POST-FURMAN STATUTES: 'MANDATORY' STATUTES, WHICH IMPOSE AN AUTOMATIC SENTENCE OF DEATH UPON CONVICTION OF A SPECIFICALLY DEFINED CRIME; AND 'GUIDED DISCRETIONARY' STATUTES, WHICH PROVIDE THE JURY WITH A LIST OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND ALLOW OR REQUIRED THEM TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY IF AT LEAST ONE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND NO MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES ARE PRESENT. IT FIRST DISCUSSES THE LIMITATION IMPOSED BY WITHERSPOON ON THE SYSTEM'S USE OF A DEATH-QUALIFIED JURY AND THE POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THESE LIMITATIONS. IT THEN EXPLORES WITHERSPOON'S UNDERLYING RATIONALE AND ITS POTENTIAL EFFECT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEATH PENALTIES IMPOSED BY THE NEW SYSTEMS.