IT ANALYZES STRATEGIES USED BY SUCCESSIVE ADMINISTRATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY FROM THE 1950'S INTO THE MID-1970'S TO OVERCOME COLLUSIVE RESISTANCE BETWEEN POLICEMEN WHO WERE ALLIED WITH GAMBLERS. INCENTIVES AND PRESSURES FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE ARE CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF THEIR COSTS AND BENEFITS AND CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE. THE DIRECTIVE STRATEGIES ANALYZED ARE: ESTABLISHING GOALS, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES; SHUFFLING PERSONNEL AND BOXES; CHANGING INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES AND ATTITUDES; AND INDUCING PRODUCTIVITY. THE CONTROL STRATEGIES STUDIED INCLUDE REPORTING MISCONDUCT AND INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES; SUPERVISING PERSONNEL; DISCOVERING MALPRACTICE; AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS, OF PARTICULAR NOTE IS A MODEL ASSESSING ADMINISTRATORS' USE OF 'FUNCTIONAL ANXIETY' (FEAR) TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE FROM SUBORDINATES. AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY TO THESE EXTERNAL CONTROLS IS ALSO EXPLORED - A LARGE-SCALE COMMITMENT TO AND INTEGRATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS WITH INDIVIDUAL GOALS THROUGH PROFESSIONALISM AND PROFESSIONALIZATION. THE APPENDIX CONTAINS DATA ON 'AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT.' A SUBJECT INDEX IS PROVIDED. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED)