THE AUTHOR FIRST EXAMINES THE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY AND DISCRETION PERMITTED IN POLICE AND COURT ACTIVITIES UNDER EXISTING LAWS, AND FINDS THAT THE BULK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISION MAKING FALLS IN THE ZONE OF LEGALLY CONFERRED DISCRETION. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THESE DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS RELIABLY PROMOTE POLICY GOALS IS THEN EXAMINED. IT IS FOUND THAT THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION IS NOT CONDUCTED TO PROMOTE SYSTEM GOALS, BUT IS INSTEAD CONDUCTED ON THE BASIS OF PERSONAL VALUES. IN SPITE OF THIS, THE AUTHOR NOTES THAT IT MAY NOT BE ADVISABLE TO SEEK RULES TO MAKE DECISION MAKING MORE UNIFORM FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: THE BIASES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISION MAKING MAY ACTUALLY REFLECT SOCIETY'S VALUES; THE PRESENT LAWS AND CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL BEHAVIOR ARE WIDELY KNOWN AND THEREFORE DO NOT VIOLATE THE 'MORALITY OF LAW'; AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES MAY POSSESS CHARACTERISTICS THAT DOOM ATTEMPTS TO PREDETERMINE DECISIONS BY RULES.