THE AUTHORS WERE CONCERNED WITH THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: WHO REPRESENTS THE INTERESTS OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH IN BUDGETING NEGOTIATIONS WITH STATE LEGISLATURES? WHO PERFORMS THIS MIDDLEMAN ROLE? DO JUDGES PARTICIPATE MORE FREQUENTLY AS STATES BECOME MORE MODERNIZED, AS THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH CHANGES? THE DATA USED TO ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS WAS DRAWN FROM A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COURT BUDGETING PROCESSES CARRIED OUT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS DURING THE SUMMER OF 1972. MAIL QUESTIONNAIRES WERE DISTRIBUTED TO OFFICIALS IN ALL THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT IN FIFTY STATES. THE QUESTIONNAIRES WERE USED TO DETERMINE WHERE THE RESPONSIBILITY LIES FOR REPRESENTING THE JUDICIARY'S INTERESTS IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, AND TO MEASURE THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH AS REFLECTED IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS. THE GROWING LITERATURE AND SOURCE MATERIAL ON STATE POLICY OUTPUTS WAS USED TO MEASURE THE DEGREE OF STATE MODERNIZATION, WHILE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE WERE USED TO CATEGORIZE PATTERNS OF LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION. THE PAPER SUGGESTS THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES ARE VULNERABLE TO DISRUPTION, THUS THREATENING A REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF RESOURCES REQUIRED BY THE JUDICIARY FOR ITS EFFECTIVE OPERATION. THE AUTHORS BELIEVE THAT RELATIONS ARE VULNERABLE TO DISRUPTION BECAUSE THE JUDICIARY ASSIGNS RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPRESENTING THE COURT'S INTERESTS IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS WITHOUT REGARD FOR LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION, WITH LITTLE REGARD FOR THE WILLINGNESS OF THE LEGISLATURE TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF RESOURCES, AND WITHOUT REGARD FOR THE DEGREE OF MODERNIZATION IN THE STATE. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT)...KAP