IN ITS DECISION IN YOUNGER V. HARRIS, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT INVOKED A TYPE OF FEDERALISTIC DEFERENCE TO STATE INSTITUTIONS. HOWEVER, THE COURT HAS NEVER DELIMITED THE RANGE OF STATE INTERESTS OR INSTITUTIONS WHICH CONSTITUTE THE INTENDED BENEFICIARIES OF THIS DEFERENCE BY THE FEDERAL COURTS. THE COURT HAS SUGGESTED FOUR POSSIBLE BASES FOR LIMITING THE INJUNCTIVE POWERS OF FEDERAL COURTS: (1) THE DESIRE TO AVOID SLIGHTING STATE COURTS BY QUESTIONING THEIR COMPETENCE OR WILLINGNESS TO ENFORCE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; (2) THE NEED TO PREVENT INTERFERENCE WITH THE ORDERLY FUNCTIONING OF STATE JUDICIAL PROCESSES; (3) THE NEED TO AVOID FEDERAL INTERFERENCE WITH SUBSTANTIVE STATE LEGISLATIVE POLICIES AND GOALS; AND (4) THE DESIRE TO PRESERVE THE DISCRETION OF STATE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS IN GENERAL AND STATE PROSECUTORS IN PARTICULAR. THE COURT'S HOLDINGS AND SUPPORTING RATIONALES IN THE AREA OF FEDERAL DEFERENCE OFTEN HAVE BEEN INCONSISTENT OR INTERNALLY FLAWED. DEFERENCE TO STATE GOALS AND TO EXECUTIVE DISCRETION SHOULD PLAY NO ROLE IN DELIMITING THE SCOPE OF YOUNGER DEFERENCE. THE RATIONALES OF DEFERENCE TO STATE JUDGES AND TO THE SANCTITY OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS POSSESS GREATER LEGITIMACY. HOWEVER, NONE OF THE FOUR ASSERTED BASES FOR DEFERENCE JUSTIFIES THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE'S SWEEPING LIMITATION ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL AUTHORITY. FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD BALANCE, ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, THE DANGER OF DISRUPTION TO STATE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE STRENGTH OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S NEED FOR IMMEDIATE REVIEW BY A FEDERAL TRIBUNAL. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED--LKM)