THE ARMED FORCES OFFER NUMEROUS TECHNICAL TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES RELEVANT TO CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT, COMPENSATION COMPARABLE TO THAT DERIVED FROM MANY FORMS OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT, AND UNIQUE OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. YET, DUE TO RESTRICTIVE ENLISTMENT POLICIES, THE DISADVANTAGED YOUNG PEOPLE WHO NEED THESE OPPORTUNITIES CANNOT OBTAIN THEM. THE ARMED FORCES' UNWILLINGNESS TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EMPLOYMENT, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION OF UNDERPRIVILEGED YOUTH IS REFLECTED IN RECRUITMENT POLICIES THAT TEND TO EXCLUDE APPLICANTS WHO HAVE NOT FINISHED HIGH SCHOOL OR WHOSE TEST SCORES INDICATE INTELLIGENCE WELL BELOW AVERAGE. ALTHOUGH SUCH ENLISTMENT POLICIES HAVE RESULTED IN SHORTAGES OF RESERVE MANPOWER, AND ALTHOUGH THE SHORTAGES COULD BE CORRECTED BY ALLOWING GREATER NUMBERS OF LESS QUALIFIED YOUTHS TO ENLIST, ARMED FORCES PLANNERS CONTINUE TO LOOK TO OTHER ALTERNATIVES. ON PAST OCCASIONS, MANY LESS QUALIFIED YOUTHS HAVE BEEN INDUCTED WITHOUT ANY DETRIMENT TO NATIONAL DEFENSE. THE ARMED FORCES SHOULD TAKE THE FOLLOWING STEPS: REDUCE THE TERMS OF INITIAL ENLISTMENT TO THE LEVEL OF PRE-VIETNAM YEARS; REINSTATE ENTRY STANDARDS THAT REQUIRE 18 TO 20 PERCENT OF ALL ENLISTEES TO BE DRAWN FROM 'MENTAL GROUP IV' (APPLICANTS WITH LOW TEST SCORES); CHANGE INSERVICE ASSIGNMENT POLICIES THAT RESULT IN LESS QUALIFIED MEN AND WOMEN BEING ASSIGNED TO COMBAT UNITS WHERE TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES ARE LIMITED; AND INCREASE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN JOB TRAINING PROGRAMS. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THESE POLICY CHANGES ON YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT AND CRIME RATES IS DISCUSSED. (LKM)