CALIFORNIA'S NEW DETERMINATE SENTENCING ACT WENT INTO EFFECT JULY 1, 1978. THE GENERAL INTENT OF THE LAW CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS: (1) A PRISON SENTENCE IS REGARDED AS A PUNITIVE SANCTION RATHER THAN COERCED TREATMENT WHOSE RATE AND DEGREE OF SUCCESS DETERMINE THE LENGTH OF PRISON STAY; (2) IT ATTEMPTS TO MAKE PENALTIES FOR EACH OFFENSE PRECISE; (3) THE DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF BOTH THE TRIAL COURTS AND LAY PAROLE BOARDS ARE REDUCED; (4) IT MAKES THE STATE JUDICIAL SYSTEM MORE OPENLY ACCOUNTABLE FOR SENTENCING IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS; AND (5) REHABILITATION SUCCESS IS STILL REWARDED THROUGH CREDITS FOR GOOD CONDUCT AND PARTICIPATION. IN THE APPLICATION OF RETROACTIVITY, THOSE ALREADY IN PRISON OR ON PAROLE UNDER THE OLD LAW ARE TO HAVE THEIR TERMS ADJUSTED BY THE COMMUNITY RELEASE BOARD IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE NEW ACT. UNDER THE ACT, THE COURT MAY EXTEND TERMS BEYOND PRESCRIBED SENTENCES FOR PARTICULAR OFFENSES IN CASES OF VIOLENT AND RECIDIVISTIC DEFENDANTS AND THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO CHANGE IN THE JUDGES'S POWER TO GRANT PROBATION IN LIEU OF PRISON IN CASES INVOLVING THE CONVICTION AND SENTENCE OF ADULT FELONS. THE ACT DOES NOT DEAL WITH THOSE FELONY CASES FOR YOUTHS BETWEEN 18 AND 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO HAVE BEEN TRIED AS ADULTS AND COMMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF THE YOUTH AUTHORITY IN LIEU OF PRISON OR PROBATION. UNDER THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF THE YOUTH AUTHORITY ACT, YOUTHS SO COMMITTED CAN BE CONFINED UP TO THEIR 25TH BIRTHDAY AND ARE PAROLABLE WITHOUT RESPECT TO ANY STATUTORY MINIMUM TERM. IN 1976, HOWEVER, THE COURT DECISION OF PEOPLE V. OLIVAS HELD THAT THE YOUTH AUTHORITY BOARD COULD NOT HOLD CRIMINAL COURT WARDS IN CUSTODY LONGER THAN THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN HELD IF THEY HAD BEEN SENTENCED TO PRISON OR JAIL AS ADULTS. AS A CONSEQUENCE, EACH YOUTH AUTHORITY CASE NOW HAS A MAXIMUM TERM COMPUTED ON THE BASIS OF THE DETERMINATE SENTENCE ACT.