THE CENTRAL THEORETICAL CONCERN OF THIS STUDY WAS EXPLAINING THE CHOICE AND EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CONTROL STRATEGIES FOR CRIMINALLY CORRUPT POLICE DEPARTMENTS. THE MAIN POLICY WAS TO DETERMINE THE MOST EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES FOR CONTROLLING POLICE CORRUPTION. THE CASES FOR THIS STUDY WERE DRAWN FROM REFORMED DEPARTMENTS. ALTHOUGH THE STUDY REFERS TO INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (SCANDAL AND REFORM) AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES (CORRUPTION), IT IS NOT A QUASI-EXPERIMENT. THE NATURE OF THE DATA PREVENTS PRECISE MEASUREMENT OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS. THE THEORETICAL MODEL USED TO EXPLAIN THE SAMPLES IS DISTINGUISHED BY THE FACT THAT POLICE CORRUPTION HAD BECOME A PUBLIC ISSUE AND THAT INTERNAL POLICE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL POLICIES WERE SUBJECTED TO EXTERNAL SCRUTINY. THE SELECTION OF THE FOUR CASES WAS BASED ON THE WILLINGNESS OF THE DEPARTMENTS TO GRANT ACCESS TO THEIR FILES. SEVEN DEPARTMENTS WERE CONTACTED--TWO GRANTED TOTAL ACCESS AND TWO OFFERED LIMITED ACCESS. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS SUGGESTED THAT THE STUDY OF NEW YORK, N.Y., OAKLAND, CALIF., NEWBURGH, N.Y., AND 'CENTRAL CITY' WOULD ALLOW FOR SUFFICIENT VARIATION. THE SOURCES OF DATA CAME FROM WRITTEN RECORDS--E.G., CITIZENS' COMPLAINTS, NEWSPAPER STORIES, POLICE FILES, ETC., AND VERBAL SOURCES--E.G., CRIMINAL TRIALS, EX-CORRUPT OFFICERS, REPORTERS, ETC. THE THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE CHOICE AND EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CONTROL STRATEGIES FOR ORGANIZATIONS IMPLY THAT A POLICY OF PREMONITORY CORRUPTION CONTROL AND CHANGES IN SANCTIONS CAN REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ORGANIZATION OF CORRUPTION. TABULAR DATA, FIGURES, FOOTNOTES, AND REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED. (JCP)