THE SCANDAL-REFORM CYCLE OBSERVED IN NEW YORK CITY, OAKLAND, CALIF., NEWBURGH, N.Y., AND A LOCALE IDENTIFIED ANONYMOUSLY AS 'CENTRAL CITY,' WAS EXAMINED IN SUPPORT OF THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS: (1) SCANDAL IS BOTH A SANCTION PUNISHING DEVIANT ORGANIZATION AND AN AGENT OF CHANGE; (2) CHANGE IN CORRUPT POLICE DEPARTMENTS IS POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY AFTER A SCANDAL OCCURS; (3) SCANDAL RESULTS FROM CONFLICT OVER ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS, AND IT REALIGNS THE POWER STRUCTURE OF THE POLICE ENVIRONMENT TO SUPPORT THE GOALS OF AN HONEST POLICE DEPARTMENT; (4) THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF REFORM DEPENDS UPON THE NATURE OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES FOR CONTROLLING CORRUPTION; AND (5) THESE STRATEGIES CAN ONLY SUCCEED BY GATHERING INFORMATION ABOUT CORRUPT POLICE BEHAVIOR, A TASK MADE DIFFICULT AND ETHICALLY QUESTIONABLE BY THE DISPERSED MANNER IN WHICH POLICE DEPARTMENTS ARE ORGANIZED. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SCANDAL AND REFORM PROCESS IN THE FOUR DEPARTMENTS BEGINS THE VOLUME. SUBSEQUENT SECTIONS PROVIDE A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF DEVIANT ORGANIZATIONS AND A SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS OF CORRUPT POLICE DEPARTMENTS AS DEVIANT ORGANIZATIONS, DESCRIBE THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORRUPT POLICE DEPARTMENTS (INCLUDING BOTH EXTERNAL CONTROL BY SCANDAL AND INTERNAL CONTROL BY ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY), AND MEASURE THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CONTROL ON POLICE CORRUPTION BY DESCRIBING CHANGES OVER TIME IN THE ORGANIZATION OF CORRUPT POLICE BEHAVIOR. GENERALIZATIONS ABOUT THE PROCESS OF SCANDAL AND REFORM IN CORRUPT POLICE DEPARTMENTS ARE ALSO PROVIDED. GRAPHIC AND TABULAR DATA ARE INCLUDED. ALONG WITH AN INDEX. REFERENCES ARE FOOTNOTED. (KBL)