IN PEOPLE V LEDROW (1974), A DEFENDANT PLEADED GUILTY TO BREAKING AND ENTERING IN EXCHANGE FOR THE PROSECUTOR'S PROMISE TO DISMISS CERTAIN OTHER PENDING CHARGES. AFTER SENTENCING, THE DEFENDANT FILED A MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY, CONTENDING THAT THE PREVAILING PRACTICE OF THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE--TO DISMISS PENDING CHARGES ONLY AFTER A 60-DAY APPEAL PERIOD HAD RUN ON A PLEA-BASED CONVICTION--CONTRAVENED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF APPEAL. THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE MOTION, STATING THAT ONLY AN EXPLICIT REQUIREMENT COMPELLING DEFENDANT TO WAIVE HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM. THE APPELLATE COURT REVERSED, RULING THAT A PLEA BARGAIN CONTAINING IMPLICIT STIPULATIONS WHICH INDUCE DEFENDANT TO WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL IS CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE. FOLLOWING AN ANALYSIS OF RELATED JUDICIAL DECISIONS, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE APPEALS COURT INSURED A DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FREE AND UNFETTERED APPEAL. IN ADDITION TO SAFEGUARDING THIS RIGHT, THE PRINCIPAL DECISION ACCOMPLISHES FOUR OTHER OBJECTIVES: (1) THE DEFENDANT IS PROTECTED FROM BEING BOUND TO AN INVOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA; (2) THE PROSECUTOR IS GIVEN AN INCENTIVE TO ENSURE THAT A VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA IS PROPERLY TAKEN AND RECORDED; (3) THE PROSECUTOR IS ENCOURAGED TO DISMISS PENDING CHARGES BEFORE THE APPEALS PERIOD HAS RUN TO AVOID ALLEGATIONS THAT THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO APPEAL HAS BEEN AFFECTED; AND (4) THE PROSECUTOR WILL NECESSARILY BE MORE CAREFUL TO ACCEPT ONLY PLEA BARGAINS THAT CAN WITHSTAND POSTCONVICTION REVIEW. (RCB)