THE CASE INVOLVED THE DISAPPEARANCE OF A CHILD. THE SUSPECT, WHO HAD FLED TO ANOTHER STATE, TURNED HIMSELF IN AND REVEALED THE LOCATION OF THE CHILD'S BODY TO POLICE DURING THE TRIP BACK TO THE CITY IN WHICH THE CRIME OCCURRED. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT REVERSED THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR MURDER ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT HAD BEEN BASED ON INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE, THIS DESPITE THE FACTS THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN INFORMED OF HIS RIGHTS AT LEAST FIVE TIMES, AND THAT THE COURT NEVER DENIED HIS GUILT. AN EXHAUSTIVE ANALYSIS IS PRESENTED OF PORTIONS OF THE TRIAL RECORD IN WHICH THE POLICE OFFICER WHO TALKED TO THE DEFENDANT DURING THE TRIP DESCRIBES WHAT HE SAID AND DID PRIOR TO THE DEFENDANT'S POINTING OUT THE LOCATION OF THE BODY. THE INCONSISTENCIES, GAPS, AND CONFUSION PERVADING THE RECORD (WHICH IN ITS ENTIRETY REPRESENTS PROCEEDINGS BEFORE FIVE COURTS OVER 8 YEARS) ILLUSTRATE WHY IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT NO UNRECORDED CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN POLICE AND SUSPECTS TAKE PLACE BETWEEN ARREST AND JUDICIAL APPEARANCE. THE DISCREPANCIES IN THE RECORD BEAR SIGNIFICANTLY ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE DEFENDANT WAS IN FACT DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. THE COURTS' UNWILLINGNESS TO REQUIRE RECORDINGS OF INTERROGATIONS IS QUESTIONED. AN ANALOGY IS DRAWN TO A SITUATION IN WHICH LAWYERS AND JUDGES IN APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS WOULD HAVE TO BASE THEIR ARGUMENTS AND DECISIONS ON EACH LAWYER'S RECOLLECTION AND INTERPRETATION OF TRIAL EVENTS, RATHER THAN ON THE OFFICIAL RECORD. IT IS POINTED OUT THAT ALL THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS BECOMES MEANINGLESS EVERY TIME A TESTIFYING OFFICER UNIMPEDED BY AN OBJECTIVE RECORD OVERLOOKS, MISINTERPRETS, OR DISTORTS A CRITICAL EVENT DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN ARREST AND COURT APPEARANCE. (LKM)