THE DOCTRINE THAT A PLAINTIFF SUING AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY MUST FIRST EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES HAS BEEN APPLIED INDISCRIMINATELY, WITHOUT REGARD TO SITUATIONS IN WHICH ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE DOCTRINE MAY NOT BE PERTINENT. ONE SUCH SITUATION IS THAT OF THE FEDERAL PRISON INMATE, WHO LIVES UNDER THE CONSTANT EYE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES AND WHOSE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ARE UNIZUELY VULNERABLE TO BIAS ON THE PART OF AUTHORITIES. ASTATUTE IS PROPOSED THAT DELINEATES CRITERIA TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT IN DECIDING WHETHER AND HOW THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE IS TO BE APPLIED IN HABEAS CORPUS ACTIONS BY FEDERAL INMATES. BECAUSE THE STATUTE IS ROOTED IN COMMON LAW DOCTRINES, A COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARY OF THE COMMON LAW OF EXHAUSTION AND OF THE RULES AND DOCTRINES THAT HAVE SPRUNG UP AROUND IT IS PRESENTED. THE PURPOSES AND JUSTIFICATIONS COMMONLY ATTRIBUTED TO THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE ARE REVIEWED. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH HABEAS CORPUS CASES MAY ARISE ARE OUTLINED, AS ARE THE SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT A STATUTE CENTERING ON SUCH CASES SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. THE FULL TEXT OF THE PROPOSED STATUTE IS PRESENTED. THE MANNER IN WHICH THE STATUTE IS DESIGNED TO OPERATE IS EXPLAINED, AND ITS LIKELY IMPACT