LABOR RELATIONS CASES CITED FROM SEVERAL JURISDICTIONS, INCLUDING NEW YORK, MASSACHUSETTS, WASHINGTON, MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY, AND PENNSYLVANIA, REPEAT THIS COMMON THEME: TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THE LEGISLATIVE OR EXECUTIVE BRANCHES INTERFERE WITH OR IMPOSE LIMITS UPON THE JUDICIARY IN REGULATING EMPLOYEE RELATIONS? ALTHOUGH THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO UNIONIZATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES, A FAIRLY RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN MOST JURISDICTIONS, HAS RANGED FROM TOTAL ACQUIESCENCE TO TOTAL REJECTION, CASES SHOW THAT A SIMPLE 'YES' OR 'NO' ANSWER TO UNIONS IS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE OF THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF MOST JUDICIAL SYSTEMS. NO JUDICIAL SYSTEM IS FINANCIALLY INDEPENDENT, AND COURT WORKERS ARE PART OF THE LARGER UNIT OF ALL GOVERNMENT WORKERS. SEVERAL STATES HAVE ADOPTED STATUTES THAT SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE OR EXCLUDE JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES FROM THE APPLICABLE THAT LABOR RELATIONS LAWS (E.G., MASSACHUSETTS AND CONNECTICUT), BUT STATES THAT HAVE NOT DONE THIS MUST RELY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PARTICULAR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING STATUTE BY THE COURTS. IN STATES THAT HAVE NOT YET ENACTED GENERAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING STATUTES, COURT EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS COMPOUNDED BY THE GENERAL PROBLEMS OF THE SCOPE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE NONSTATUTORY BARGAINING RIGHTS. SEVERAL PROBLEMS REMAIN, INCLUDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW GIVING AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY SOME CONTROL OVER JUDICIAL FUNCTIONING, THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGITIMATE EMPLOYER OF JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES, THE SPECIFICATION OF JUST WHO ARE JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES, AND THE RIGHT OF SUPERVISORS AS APPOINTED OFFICIALS TO BARGAIN. REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED.