TRADITIONALLY, THE LEGAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL CORPORATE MISCONDUCT HAVE TAKEN TWO TACKS. THE FIRST HAS BEEN TO ALLOW A FIRM A GREAT DEAL OF AUTONOMY IN ITS PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION, WITH PENALTIES ASSESSED IF ITS CHOICES INVOLVE MISCONDUCT. IF A MANUFACTURER'S PRODUCT IS SUBSTANDARD AND CAUSES INJURY, THE COMPANY (UNDER THE COUNTERORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES) OR SOMETIMES SELECT EMPLOYEES (UNDER THE COUNTERPERSONNEL STRATEGIES) MAY BE HELD ANSWERALBE. THE SECOND APPROACH (WHICH CAN BE VIEWED AS EVOLVING FROM SHORTCOMINGS IN THE FIRST APPROACH) HAS BEEN TO DISPLACE THE JUDGEMENT OF THE FIRMS WITH THE JUDGMENT OF PUBLIC AGENCIES REGARDING CERTAIN PRODUCT, SERVICE, OR MORE RECENTLY, WORK-PLACE QUALITIES. THE INTENT OF THIS SECOND APPROACH IS TO DECREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF HARMFUL BEHAVIOR THROUGH DIRECT LEGAL REQUIREMENTS REGARDING COROPRATE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND DECISION PROCESSES. FORMS OF THIS SECOND APPROACH CAN BE CONSIDERED ORGANIZATIONAL-ADJUSTMENT MEASURES OF CONTROL. ORGANIZATIONAL-ADJUSTMENT MEASURES MANDATED BY GOVERNMENT OR JUDICIAL ACTION ARE FRAUGHT WITH RISKS, BECAUSE THEY INVOLVE INTERVENTION INTO HIGHLY COMPLEX AND SPECIALIZED ENTERPRISES WHICH MAY BE SERIOUSLY HARMED BY THE INEPT ACTION OF A LEGAL AUTHORITY. BEFORE THEIR WHOLESALE USE CAN BE ADVOCATED, CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT MUST BE GIVEN TO THE SORTS OF SITUATIONS THAT MIGHT WARRANT THEIR USE ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS. SOME LEVEL OF RATIONAL COOPERATION BETWEEN 'OUTSIDERS' WHO ARE MANDATED TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC FROM HARM AND ORGANIZATIONAL 'INSIDERS' WHO SHOULD HAVE THAT SAME CONCERN WOULD SEEM TO BE PROFITABLE IN FORMULATING SYSTEMS OF PRODUCTION AND SERVICES WHICH ARE SAFE AND NONEXPLOITATIVE FOR THE CONSUMER, EMPLOYEES, AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC. NO REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED. (RCB)