BECAUSE THE TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC RESTRAINTS ON THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE DECREASED AS ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIALIZE, THE LAEA TASK OF ASSURING THAT NONNUCLEAR COUNTRIES DO NOT ACQUIRE ATOMIC WEAPONS HAS BECOME MORE DIFFICULT. UNDER LAEA SAFEGUARDS AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NONNUCLEAR COUNTRIES MAY USE NUCLEAR MATERIALS ONLY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. A REVIEW OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE TREATY AND THE LAEA MEASURES REVEALS DIFFICULTIES IN THE SUPERVISION OF NUCLEAR REACTORS PROVIDED BY TREATY SIGNATORIES TO NONSIGNATORIES. CONTROLS OVER COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER COMPANIES AND OVER THE DEVELOPMENT OF 'PEACEFUL' ATOMIC EXPLOSIVES ARE DIFFICULT TO ENFORCE. MOREOVER, THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES IS NOT DESCRIBED BY THE LAEA SAFEGUARDS LISTING, SINCE SECURITY AND ACCOUNTING FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS IS DELEGATED TO THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES. NEVERTHELESS, THE INVENTORY ACCOUNTABILITY PROVISIONS AND VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE SAFEGUARDS WILL HAVE ACHIEVED THEIR PURPOSE IF WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IS DELAYED OR PREVENTED. THE TREATY PROVISIONS AND THE EFFORTS OF THE LAEA ALSO SERVE AS A USEFUL PRECEDENT FOR DISARMAMENT MEASURES AND INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR GATHERING INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR ENERGY. APPENDED MATERIALS INCLUDE MEMORANDA ON THE EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND ON THE INSPECTORATE OF THE IAEA. FOOTNOTES ARE PROVIDED. (TWK)