IN THE U.S., CIVILIAN POLICE FORCES HAVE BEEN AUGMENTED BY SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS (SWAT) TEAMS TO DEAL WITH VIOLENT INCIDENTS WITHOUT MILITARY HELP. DESPITE THE SUCCESSFUL ISRAELI RESCUE AT ENTEBBE, THE MILITARY OPTION SHOULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN LIGHTLY. NEVERTHELESS, USE OF MILITARY FORCE MIGHT BE REQUIRED (1) TO RESCUE NATIONALS HELD ABROAD, (2) TO PURSUE TERRORISTS WHO HAVE CAPTURED A NUCLEAR DEVICE OR INSTRUMENT OF MASS DESTRUCTION, (3) TO RESPOND TO A SPECIFIC THREAT DIRECTED AGAINST ONE OR MORE COUNTRIES, (4) TO ATTACK THE BASE OF A TERRORIST GROUP OPERATING ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, AND (5) TO RETALIATE AGAINST A SPECIFIC TERRORIST ATTACK. THREE PROBLEM AREAS COMPLICATE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER INTERNATIONAL FORCES COULD BE ESTABLISHED TO DEAL WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. FIRST, THE COMPOSITION, STRUCTURE, AND NATURE OF SUCH MILITARY FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED. SECOND, THE NEED FOR MULTILATERAL DECISIONMAKING TO USE SUCH A FORCE RAISES ISSUES OF SECRECY, TIMING, AND THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS. THIRD, NUMEROUS LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS WOULD NEED TO BE CONSIDERED. THE MILITARY OPTION IS A MEASURE OF LAST RESORT, BUT IT MUST BE SERIOUSLY DEBATED BY INTERNATIONAL BODIES. PRIOR MUTILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND MULTINATIONAL FORCES WOULD REDUCE THE POTENTIAL ADVERSE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF USING THE MILITARY OPTION. FOR RELATED PAPERS FROM THE SAME SEMINAR, SEE NCJ-63591-63596 AND 63598-63600. (CFW)