THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS APPLY TO ALL FISSIONABLE MATERIALS WITHIN THE PARTICIPATING STATE OR AREAS OF ITS CONTROL, AND OBLIGE THE STATE NOT TO DIVERT MATERIALS FROM PEACEFUL USES TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE VALUE OF AN INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEPENDS UPON ITS CAPACITY TO SATISFY THE TWO CRITERIA OF CREDIBILITY AND ACCEPTABILITY. THESE CRITERIA ARE FREQUENTLY ANTAGONISTIC BECAUSE HIGHLY CREDIBLE SYSTEMS INTRUDE UPON A NATION'S SOVEREIGNTY AND ARE LESS LIKELY TO BE ADHERED TO BY THE STATE. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL UTILITY AND LIMITATIONS OF SAFEGUARDS INDICATES THE IMPORTANCE OF BALANCING AND MODIFYING THE TWO CRITERIA IN THE 'REALPOLITIK' OF WORLD AFFAIRS. DESPITE THE POSITIVE FUNCTION OF SAFEGUARDS IN INDICATING WHICH NATIONS WISH TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION, THE RESTRICTIONS CAN DETECT BUT NOT PREVENT THE DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS. INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORS CANNOT SEEK OUT CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR FACILITIES; THEY MAY ONLY VERIFY COMPLIANCE AT DECLARED FACILITIES. NEVERTHELESS, THE PROBABILITY CAN BE REDUCED THAT STATES WITH THE CAPACITY TO PRODUCE WEAPONS WILL DO SO. ANCILLARY SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS CAN REDUCE THE EMPHASIS PLACED UPON THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY PRESSURING NON-WEAPONS-POSSESSING COUNTRIES TO JOIN TEST BAN CONVENTIONS AND BY PENALIZING NATIONS WHICH DEVELOP WEAPONS SYSTEMS. CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE WOULD MAKE INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT MORE DIFFICULT FOR SINGLE STATES AND WOULD BE AN ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE SAFEGUARD. FOOTNOTES ARE PROVIDED. (TWK)