FOLLOWING ADOPTION OF THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT), THE U.S. AND GREAT BRITAIN VOLUNTEERED TO PUT THEIR CIVILIAN NUCLEAR INDUSTRY UNDER NPT'S INTERNAL SAFEGUARDS. THEIR GOAL WAS TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SAFEGUARDS BEING ASKED OF OTHER COUNTRIES. THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) HAS DEVELOPED GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND TECHNICAL PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING FACILITY INSPECTIONS. THESE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS FACE SUCH CONCERNS AS SOVEREIGNTY INFRINGEMENT, FINANCES, LANGUAGE BARRIERS, NATIONAL SECURITY MAINTENANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INCLUDE WHICH FACILITIES TO INSPECT, INSPECTION METHODS, DATA REQUIREMENTS, PROTECTION OF PROPRIETARY INFORMATION, ANALYTIC METHODS, REPORTING OF RESULTS, AND TYPES OF INSPECTORS TO USE. SAFEGUARDS ARE BASED ON TWO PRINCIPLES: THAT THEIR GOAL IS TO DETECT RATHER THAN PREVENT MATERIALS THEFT AND THAT A PERFECT SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM IS IMPOSSIBLE. AN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) MEETING WITH U.S. INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES IN 1971 INDICATED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS WOULD PROBABLY SELECT FACILITIES BY LOTTERY, USE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS SIMILAR TO THE AEC'S, AND FOCUS ON THREE MATERIALS BALANCE AREAS (RECEIPT AND STORAGE, IN-PROCESS, AND SHIPMENT). SAFEGUARDS DURING TRANSIT ARE A CONTINUING MAJOR CONCERN. IN 1971 A TEST INSPECTION WAS CONDUCTED BY IAEA AND AEC PERSONNEL AT WESTINGHOUSE'S FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY IN COLUMBIA, S.C. RESULTS INDICATED THAT NPT PROVISIONS ARE MOSTLY REALISTIC BUT THAT THE TEST COST WAS EXTREMELY HIGH. DESPITE CONTINUING INDUSTRY CONCERNS THAT SAFEGUARDS REQUIREMENTS WILL BECOME PROHIBITIVELY EXPENSIVE, THE IAEA APPEARS TO BE TAKING A REASONABLE APPROACH AND BUILDING ITS SYSTEM ON THAT OF THE U.S. DOMESTIC SYSTEM. AUDIENCE DISCUSSION IS INCLUDED. (CFW)