ISSUE IS TAKEN WITH THE CLAIMS MADE FOR THE EQUITY THEORY WHICH HAS PROVIDED A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR MUCH OF THE RESEARCH ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE LEGAL PROCESS. THE ARGUMENT IS OFFERED THAT NOT ONLY IS EQUITY NOT A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL INTERACTION, IT IS INCOMPLETE EVEN AS A THEORY OF SITUATIONS THAT EXPLICITLY CENTER ON MATTERS OF JUSTICE. FURTHER, THE THESIS PROPOSES THAT ACTION AIMED AT RESTORING EQUITY AND REDRESSING INJUSTICE, WHETHER TAKEN BY VICTIMS, HARMDOERS, OR THIRD-PARTY LEGAL ACTORS, IS AFFECTED BY THE CASUAL ATTRIBUTIONS MADE ABOUT THE INEQUITY. WHILE CASUAL ATTRIBUTIONS ARE NOT FULLY DETERMINANT OF RESPONSES TO INEQUITY, THEY ARE MEDIATING FACTORS WHICH ARE COMMONLY INVOKED IN INFORMAL SOCIAL INTERACTION. YET EQUITY THEORISTS HAVE IGNORED THEIR INFLUENCE, VIEWING REACTIONS TO INJUSTICE AS AFFECTED ONLY BY THE DEGREE OF IMBALANCE OR INEQUITY BETWEEN RELATORS. WITH THIS THESIS IN TOW, THE BASIC TENETS OF EQUITY THEORY ARE REVIEWED AND QUESTIONS RAISED AS TO THE NEED FOR A GREATER INTEGRITY OF EQUITY AND ATTRIBUTION CONCERNS. SOME OF THE PRESENT SHORTCOMINGS OF THE EQUITY APPROACH ARE REVIEWED, AND A FRAMEWORK FOR REFINING EXISTING EQUITY FORMULATIONS BY APPLYING PRINCIPLES FROM SEVERAL ATTRIBUTION APPROACHES GIVEN. THIS FRAMEWORK PROVIDES A BASIS FOR REVISING EQUITY NOTIONS AND POINTS TO FURTHER RESEARCH REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EQUITY AND THE LAW. REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED. (MJW)