The juvenile law issues most frequently litigated before the Court within the last 15 years are those concerning the constitutional rights of children charged with acts that would be crimes if committed by adults. 'In re Gault' (1967), was the Court's first major effort to posit an analytical framework for evaluation of the constitutional rights of juvenile delinqents. In this decision the Court refused to accept myths surrounding the juvenile courts. Following 'Gault' the Court decided three major delinquency cases. 'In re Winship' (1970), held that the reasonable doubt standard was an essential element of due process and thus precluded guilty convictions in criminal cases and finding of delinquency in juvenile cases on the basis of a lesser standard of proof. The Court's 1971 decision in 'McKeiver v. Pennsylvania' held that juveniles charged with delinquency were not constitutionally entitled to jury trials at thhe adjudicatory hearing. 'McKeiver' may thus be seen as an analytical retrenchment from the previous cases. In a marked departure from the 'McKeiver' case, in 1975 the Court ruled in 'Breed v. Jones' that the double jeopardy clause prohibited the State from trying a child in criminal court as an adult if the youth had previously been subjected to an adjudicatory hearing in juvenile court on the same charge. Since this decision, it has become unclear what test will govern either applicability or content of constitutional rights in delinquency cases. Court decisions still give alleged juvenile delinquents significantly less constitutional protection than adults charged with crime. It is suggested herein that the dual-maximal approach initially stated in 'Gault' should be consistently employed. Under this approach, functional equivalence becomes a floor rather than a ceiling for ascertaining rights of alleged delinquents, and fundamental fairness can be used to provide additional rights necessary to overcome the child's immaturity. Footnotes are included in the article.