Much judicial discussion regarding interrogation and the use of confessions has occurred in the last several decades. The courts have generally sought to balance the need to protect individuals from coercive police conduct with the need for effective law enforcement. It is generally agreed that the paramount objective in the use of confessions is reliability. To ensure reliability, the courts have established a number of procedural safeguards to discourage improper interrogation practices. However, the courts have not been consistent about the degree to which police should be made to frustrate the attainment of their own objective, the obtaining of confessions, and the closing of cases. The earliest pre-Miranda confession cases which confronted the Supreme Court were disposed of by means of reference to the 14th amendment concept of due process, as in the 1936 decision of Brown v. Mississippi. In later cases the voluntariness test concept was introduced, but it was often criticized as discretionary and nebulous. The need for development of a consistent code of conduct applicable to police interrogations was partially satisfied by the Court's 1964 ruling in Escobedo v. Illinois, which was based on the sixth amendment right to counsel at pretrial confrontations. The Court's landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), provided a broader variety of procedural protections, based upon the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Subsequent to Miranda, frequently litigated problems involve the definition of interrogation. In Brewer v. Williams (1977), interrogation was interpreted as conduct which is not entirely inquisitorial but which is nevertheless likely to elicit an incriminating response. The 1978 case of Rhode Island v. Innis further clarified controversial concepts related to the law of interrogations and confessions. Footnotes with references are included in the article.