Although jury service is not currently voluntary in England, summoning officers of the court are lenient in permitting persons to be excused from jury service, particularly where it is likely to be long term. Self-selection by jurors may well be occurring at present as a result of the incentive that high income earners have to avoid jury service, particularly those who are self-employed or who do not have their customary wages paid while serving on a jury. The low ceiling on the maximum compensation that can be claimed for loss of earnings can result in a significant financial loss for such high income earners who might serve on the jury of a lengthy trial. Such self-selection has the effect of reducing the value of production lost as a result of jury service, a saving that may or may not be regarded as worth the sacrifice of jury representativeness. If some degree of self-selection and lack of representativeness is considered acceptable, alternative systems, such as voluntary jury service, that exploit financial incentives in the search for cost reduction may be worth investigating. The elimination of self-selection would require increasing both the volume of opportunity costs and the volume of public expenditure. Such increases would make decisionmaking devices other than juries relatively more attractive than at present. One table and 12 references are provided. (Author abstract modified)