In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice presented a balanced view of the complex role of the police. It recognized the variety of situations in which the police are expected to intervene, and while acknowledging the arguments for reducing the police officer's duties. However, in 1969, the Republican administration introduced the concept of 'crime specific planning' at LEAA. Repudiating what is called 'system tinkering,' the administration required all planning, funding, and research to focus on specific crime reduction objectives. Since then, the most important role of the police has been viewed as crime fighting, and almost all police resources have been marshaled to combat crime. This narrow view has proved unproductive. Millions of dollars spent on research and scores of new programs and techniques have yet to demonstrate that greater police attention to crime can significantly reduce it. For example, a study in Kansas City, Mo., could find no significant relationship between the speed of police response and the likelihood of either harm to the victim or arrest of the culprit, and research in other cities has demonstrated that most arrests -- even for serious crimes -- are made by patrol officers performing their routine duties. Based on the results of these and other studies, a return to wider police responsibilites is recommended. Further research is suggested into the police response to different types of incidents, means of educating the public as to when the police should be called, improvements in police training, and rewards for improved officers' performances. Recent literature suggesting directions for improvements is reviewed. Notes and references are included.