The proposed legislation would create an independent agency within the executive branch, designed to represent the interests of consumers before other Federal agencies and in the courts. Arguments for the concept include the view that government agencies are frequently 'captured' by the business they are charged with regulating. This view suggests that an agency will tend to respond most favorably to those organized interests that are most influential. Moreover, producers, as opposed to single consumers, tend to be better organized and able to influence agency action. Studies have indicated that price-fixing and other anticompetitive actions raise price levels by as much as $80 billion a year. In addition, transportation economists have estimated that price-fixing and waste allowed under existing regulations cost the consumer between $8 to $16 billion yearly. In contrast, the new consumer agency will cost $15 million for the first year. Further, the creation of more large bureaucracies or the expansion of present ones will be avoided. Instead, a relatively small number of professionals will provide, on a case-by-case basis, information to Federal agencies on behalf of the consumer. Opponents of the new central agency argue that there are already numerous consumer representatives in the Federal Government such as The Office of Consumer Affairs and the Federal Trade Commission. For example, a 1969 study for the President found that 413 units of the Federal Government have been administering 938 consumer-related activities. Therefore, it is suggested that before Congress creates a new agency, it should determine whether such activities are inadequate, and if so, what can be done to improve them. A history of consumer agency proposals is given. A discussion of the agency powers including the concept of independence, exemptions, State and local activities, informal proceedings, judicial review, and information gathering are included. A total of 61 footnotes are also included.