Concern over the process by which Federal judgeships are created has centered around the erratic nature of the judgeship creation process. The need for judgeships grows fairly continuously, but the legislative action necessary to create them is often delayed. A review of the judgeship creation practices of 23 States suggests that the process of selecting judges affects the likelihood and ease of creating judgeships. The crucial factor is not eliminating partisanship in judicial appointments but ensuring that political conflicts do not pit the executive against the legislative branch. It is recommended that authority to create Federal court judgeships be delegated to the Judicial Conference of the United States, which should develop explicit and public procedures for the exercise of this new authority. Judgeship creation under this authority should be limited to no more than eight additional positions per year. The Judicial Conference should have the authority to shift judgeships from one district or circuit to another by ruling that the next vacancy in a designated district or circuit not be filled. If this shifting is permitted, no additional judgeships should be created in a year in which overall Federal case filings have declined. Congress should be able to veto part or all of the actions taken under this delegated authority by simple resolution passed within 90 days of the conference's submission of its recommendations to the House and Senate. One table and footnotes are provided. (Author summary modified)