The juvenile justice system has been a product of interaction between legal and socio-medical forces since its inauguration near the end of the last century. While the socio-medical forces have, for the most part, been dominant over the years, concern for minimum legal standards has been a conspicuous part of the picture since the years, concern for minimum legal standards has been a conspicuous part of the picture since the years 1966 to 1967. The result is serious attention to due process and fundamental fairness in court processing, and low tolerance for abridgement of such rights in the interests of attaining the social goal of rehabilitation. Some have argued that important due process rights should be components in the process leading to probation, and even police, diversion. Analysis of actual and potential losses of freedom associated with diversion decisions leads to the general conclusion that very few diversion programs required usual procedural rights. Moreover, a survey of case law indicates that there is little reason to expect that the procedural protections enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court so strongly in the 1960s will be extended by the courts to police (or probation) decisions on diversion in the 1980s. (Author abstract)