From the standpoint of legal theory, race-based sentencing contravenes the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Although the equal protection clause is explicit in its prohibition of unequal treatment on the basis of race, several Supreme Court decisions over the past 4 years have rendered proving this contention difficult, especially in an attempt to challenge judges' discretionary sentencing. Compelling proof of purposeful discrimination is necessary to substantiate all discrimination claims, even for decisions by elected public officials acting singly or in groups. Discrimination in sentencing can be established, however, by examining statistics to establish long-term, substantial disparity in decisions. The illegal use of race as a factor in sentencing also offends the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court has created an 'apprehension of vindictiveness' test to ascertain if judges or prosecutors have abused their powers even though criminal defendants were deterred from exercising various constitutional privileges. Under this test, it could be argued that a pattern of disparate sentences for black defendants evinced by statistical evidence offends notions of fairness and reflect the sentencing judge's racial bias or vindictiveness. Because of the principle of noninterference of Federal courts in the operation of State courts, the only available remedy to persons who have received longer sentences because of race is remand to another State court judge. Favorable decisions in the remand court could serve as real impetus to promote sentencing reform legislation. Notes are supplied.