The entrustment, by way of trial, to the social service is not merely liable of revocation, an extinctive figure expressly regulated by the penitentiary law, but is also subject to interruption. In the absence of provisions of the law in this connection, delicate problems of systematic framing and logical interpretation emerge. Special attention should be paid to cases in which a new criminal sentence is rendered regarding the person entrusted to the social service. The major issue consists in the identification of the assumptions that entail the discontinuance of the entrustment and in the thorough determination of the value to be recognized in the already elapsed trial period. Ruling out that it may be viewed as a cause for the extinction of the punishment, it should be considered as a criminal sanction restricting personal freedom. Hence, the possibility of recognizing, in case of discontinuance, an expiation for the punishment. A total of 20 footnotes are included. (Author summary modified)