The article traces the historic development in England of judicial discretion to exclude certain types of illegally obtained evidence and then examines the culmination of this common law development, the 1979 decision of the House of Lords in R. v. Sang. This decision found that a trial judge has the discretion to exclude evidence when its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value and can exclude confessions, admissions, and other evidence the police obtain from the accused after the commission of the offense. However, all other evidence, even that obtained by improper or unfair means, cannot be subject to the exclusionary discretion. The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure in its 1981 report proposed substantial modifications in the exercise and scope of the exclusionary rule as applied by English trial courts. It recommended that Parliament enact a system of rules that would balance the results-oriented view and the reliability and protective principles view, essentially eliminating judicial discretion. Specifically, it detailed procedures by which police should conduct search and seizures, suggested sweeping changes in methods used by police to obtain statements from the accused, and recognized the nature of the right to silence. However, the Commission consistently concluded that courts should automatically exclude illegally obtained evidence in order to protect individual rights, but should never exclude evidence merely to ensure that the prosecution uses only evidence that is reliable. This protective principle would be even more appropriate in the United States, since it would be constitutionally valid and reflects the fundamental considerations upon which the Court relied in originally establishing the rule. The article includes 284 footnotes.