In the past, Florida judges have attempted to circumvent a parole policy which they considered to be ineffective. They withheld imposition of sentence on a defendant found guilty of the crime for which he/she was charged and imposed an order of probation with the condition that the defendant serve a lengthy term in the county jail or State penitentiary. Because the defendant was not incarcerated pursuant to a sentence but rather as a condition of probation, he/she was technically ineligible for parole consideration even after serving the statutory period of confinement. The authority to impose incarceration as a condition of probation is established by Florida Statutes section 948.01(4). The interpretation and application of this section have continually caused debate. The abuse of the statute has arisen from its failure to prescribe the reasonable lengths of incarceration which could be imposed as a condition of probation. In Villery, the Florida Supreme Court attempted to quell much of the controversy by setting a maximum of less than 1 year for which incarceration may be imposed as a condition of probation. Since the Villery decision, the Florida district courts of appeal have affirmed numerous pre-Villery convictions but remanded the cases to the trial courts for resentencing in accordance with Villery. Subsequent trial court rulings imposing the split sentence alternative or incarceration as a condition of probation have been carefully framed within the parameters of Villery. Seventy-five footnotes are provided.