These diverse experiences raise questions about the continued acceptability of the process and the role of the arbitrator in protecting the process from attack. The following conclusions are suggested. In the face of a lengthy strike, particularly in an industry dependent on public monies and support such as transit, the parties themselves are likely to opt for interest arbitration to resolve impasses; in anticipation of a lengthy strike, absent the parties voluntarily agreeing to interest arbitration, the legislature itself is likely to impose interest arbitration to avoid future inconvenience as well as threats to health and safety (New York City transit experience); if getting the parties to bargain is the objective, final offer arbitration is preferable; in difficult economic times, people are less willing to give an outsider carte blanche to dictate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; and if the process of interest arbitration is to be viable, it must continue to be acceptable to those involved and to the governmental body with appropriate legislative authority, lest the process agreeable to the parties be overridden by the legislature.