Lower courts and legislatures are left with little guidance about the appropriate test of the constitutionality of the death penalty because the Enmund decision is so narrowly defined. The Court ruled that while Enmund, an accomplice, participated in an armed robbery that resulted in two deaths, he did not intend to kill, try to kill, or actually kill the victims. The ruling leaves unclear whether the death penalty could constitutionally be applied to an accomplice who did not take part in the actual killing but who intended that the victim be killed. The decision restricts the degree of punishment that may be imposed and may effectively interfere with the States' right to define legal guilt for certain offenses. A more disturbing aspect is the Court's continued reliance on 'evolving standards of decency' as the barometer for eighth amendment decisions. Even assuming that the amendment's moral content can be determined, not by majority preference but by society's informed and sensitive members, agreeing on the definitions of these qualities would be impossible. Thus, the appeal to a consensus of truly enlightened individuals becomes pointless, and the propriety of the Court's reliance on the notion of evolving moral standards is seriously undermined. In its analysis of cruel and unusual punishment, the Court must develop an ethical theory that avoids the logical pitfalls of majority preference and total subjectivity. A total of 104 footnotes are provided.