Since 1970, a defendant in the District of Columbia who raises the insanity defense has had the burden of establishing insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. In 'Jones,' the U.S. Supreme Court held that the District of Columbia statutory scheme that permits the indefinite hospitalization of insanity acquittees is not offensive to due process rights, even though the government need not carry the burden of proof as to the mental illness or dangerousness of the acquittee. The Court also ruled that the period of hospitalization need bear no relation to the prison term the acquittee would have served had he been convicted of the charged crime. The Court made an erroneous decision, because it relied on two false assumptions: (1) the insanity acquittal sufficiently proves mental illness and dangerousness so as to justify commitment and (2) the risk of erroneous commitment is less in confinements resulting from insanity acquittals than in those resulting from civil commitment proceedings. The Court should have used a separate due process analysis for the case, because the deprivation of liberty was so severe. A total of 131 footnotes are provided.