In one case involving the Environmental Protection Agnecy (EPA) and a paper company, an agreement was reached in which the company had to implement steps to mitigate a number of pollution problems before EPA would issue a permit for a less polluting, but also more cost-effective, boiler. In addition, the agreement was incorporated as part of a consent degree, thus expediting court enforcement in the event of noncompliance. In this case, a perceived compliance problem was solved. The structure of the agreement, not the terms themselves, encouraged the company to action. In a second case, a power company was concerned that stricter regulations in the future might render expensive pollution-control equipment obsolete. The problem was solved by making the agreement regulation-specific to the power facility, thereby making it more difficult for the Government to effect a revision at a later date. In another case, the specific dispute concerned a sewage treatment facility, but the real issue was growth control. In this case, no resolution was reached. In the final case, a dispute between a water board and environmentalists, an agreement to ensure adequate public participation in decisionmaking was reached. In negotiated agreements where there may be compliance problems, the negotiator should classify the problem in terms of deliberate noncompliance, unavoidable noncompliance, or unintentional noncompliance. Such a typology may aid in the assessment of incentives for noncompliance and how these might be restructured.