Some fraudsters already have an existing business and exploit the credit rating they have built up, while others buy new or existing firms to generate a credit rating and then use pretexts to explain their need for enhanced credit. Provided that suppliers request credit references from bureaus, these bureaus can build up a pattern of suspicious trading that fits the long-firm fraud model and can use technology to check the fit between references and existing databases to look for mutual referencing between undisclosed, interconnected companies. Police action against fraudsters enhances risks for both criminal professionals and professional criminals. Serious credit control efforts will be made against such fraud, however, only when fraud levels rise across the board. The author notes the organization of long-firm fraud requires five components: finance, persons willing to participate in the crime, victims who have assets, skill levels appropriate to the complexity of the crime, and the ability to escape conviction. Skills of fraudsters and techniques they use to finance and implement fraudulent schemes and to avoid arrest and conviction are detailed. 11 notes