Alternative remittance systems are operated by entities ("alternative remittance agents") for moving money between jurisdictions on behalf of customers who do not wish to directly use the formal banking system. The potential for criminal abuse of such systems is substantial due to their largely unregulated nature and their ability to preserve the anonymity of their customers and conceal the source of funds remitted. In Australia alternative remittance systems have been used to facilitate the laundering of proceeds of organized crime, including drug trafficking and large-scale revenue evasion. The current study obtained information from overseas law enforcement agencies and financial regulators regarding methods of investigation and control of money laundering via AR/UBS. As in most overseas countries visited, currently in Australia there are limited means by which money laundering via AR/UBS can be deterred, detected, or prosecuted. Remittance agents are not considered to undertake "banking business" and as such are not regulated by banking laws or obliged to reveal their activities. Based upon overseas experience, this report recommends a series of eight measures for adoption on a national and international basis to improve the regulation/control and investigation of money laundering via AR/UBS. Among the recommendations was that the Australian Government give careful consideration to the introduction of a system of registration of alternative remittance agents, similar to the models in place in the United States and Hong Kong. Further, it was recommended that Australian law enforcement agencies develop and/or enhance existing financial investigation training courses to include components on the investigation of money laundering via alternative remittance systems. Recommendations were also offered on ways in which information on underground banking procedures could be shared across national and international jurisdictions. 62 notes and appended program of visits for the study