For the purposes of this study, the author defined "treachery" as "a deliberate betrayal of another person's trust; whereas, "deceit" involved "the ensnaring of another by guile or trickery." Within warfare, these two tactics may be used separately; for example, a sneak attack or concealed ambush may be treacherous if the attackers have been on good, outward terms with the victims. Deceit may have a role in a concealed ambush if the enemy is lured into it. Treachery and deceit sometimes may be combined, such as when aggressors make deliberate plans to attack opponents during peacemaking ceremonies or opportunistically assault noncombatants. As with concealed ambush, the tactical aim is apparently to increase the vulnerability of victims while reducing that of the attackers through the use of surprise. What distinguishes treacherous and deceitful ambush is the necessity of either peaceful social interaction between attackers and victims immediately prior to the assault, or at least the expectation of peaceful interaction. The cross-cultural evidence indicates that treacherous, deceitful ambushes have been infrequent but geographically and temporally dispersed in so-called small-scale tribal systems. Such attacks have also been occasionally used in state-level societies for assassinations. Because state infrastructures are often guerrilla/terrorist targets, sneak attacks or ambushes are apparently the preferred tactic. Al-Qaeda's reliance on so-called "sleeper" agents suggests the potential for some sort of treacherous attack, especially against culturally similar civilian targets. Added to this is the shift in terrorist organization from hierarchical cell structures to loosely connected, linear networks, which allows for more independence in making increasingly lethal tactical decisions, as well as increased anonymity. Under these conditions, there may yet be an increase in treacherous attacks based on some degree of social interaction with potential victims. Some guerrilla/terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda, come from regions with well-established ethics of honor and blood revenge. In such cultures, treachery may be an acceptable means of "payback." Al-Qaeda operatives or their sympathizers might use treacherous ambushes against small units of U.S. Special Forces or allied forces deployed in Afghanistan. Attention to tribal patterns of lethal treachery may thus be important in guarding against such attacks. 88 notes