THE MODEL VIEWS THE PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS AS ANALOGOUS TO A BUYING-AND-SELLING TRANSACTION IN A MARKET THAT HAS NO FIXED PRICES. EACH PARTY TO THE PLEA BARGAIN HAS IN MIND A ROUGH NOTION OF HOW HIGH OR HOW LOW HE IS WILLING TO GO BEFORE BREAKING OFF NEGOTIATIONS AND TURNING TO THE TRIAL ALTERNATIVE. THESE LIMITS ARE AFFECTED BY A MULTITUDE OF VARIABLES, INCLUDING PROBABILITY OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE, THE COST OF TRIAL FOR BOTH PARTIES, OR THE EFFECT OF SENTENCING AND CONVICTION FOR BOTH PARTIES. HOWEVER, CHANGES IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS SUCH AS INCREASED FREE COUNSEL; INCREASED PRETRIAL RELEASE, OR INCREASED COURT CONGESTION WILL AFFECT THE BARGAINING PROCESS. A CHANGE THAT INCREASES THE PROBABILITY OF CONVICTION (SUCH AS MORE LENIENT ADMISSIBILITY OF POLICE-OBTAINED EVIDENCE) OR THAT INCREASES SENTENCING PAYOFFS (SUCH AS NEW MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES) WILL CAUSE A FLUCTUATION IN THE PROSECUTOR'S AND DEFENDANT'S BARGAINING LIMITS. THE AUTHORS PROVIDE SAMPLE APPLICATIONS OF THIS THEORY TO ILLUSTRATE HOW CHANGES IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS WILL AFFECT THE PLEA NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND TO DEMONSTRATE HOW ADJUSTMENTS IN THE PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS CAN BE MADE TO OFFSET THESE CHANGES. FINALLY, THE AUTHORS STATE THAT THIS KIND OF ANALYSIS OF THE PLEA NEGOTIATION PROCESS MAY LEAD TO POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO HOW THE PROCESS CAN BE MADE TO RESULT IN SETTLEMENTS THAT BETTER REFLECT THE TRUE PROBABILITIES OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE. IF PLEA BARGAINING CAN THEREBY BE MADE TO RESULT IN A SETTLEMENT THAT APPROXIMATES THE TRIAL OUTCOME, THE MAIN BENEFIT OF PLEA BARGAINING - REDUCTION IN DELAYS - CAN BE REALIZED WITHOUT ADVERSELY AFFECTING THE JUSTICE PROCESS.