PLEA BARGAINING, IN WHICH THE DEFENDANT AGREES TO PLEAD GUILTY IN RETURN FOR FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION SUCH AS A REDUCED CHARGE OR REDUCED SENTENCE, IS USUALLY PRACTICED DURING WHISPERED CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION JUST BEFORE THE CASE IS HEARD IN COURT. HOWEVER, SOME STATES HAVE INSTITUTIONALIZED THE PROCEDURE BY ALLOWING SCHEDULED CONFERENCES AT WHICH THE MATTER IS DISCUSSED BY THE DEFENDANT, HIS ATTORNEY, AND THE PROSECUTOR. PLEA BARGAINS ARE ENCOURAGED BECAUSE: THEY CONSERVE COURT RESOURCES; SOME FEEL THAT THE ADMISSION OF GUILT IS THE FIRST STEP TOWARD REHABILITATION; AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS KNOW THAT A GUILTY PERSON WHO INSISTS ON A TRIAL MAY BE VIEWED AS A TROUBLEMAKER AND RECEIVE A MORE SEVERE PENALTY THAN IF A PLEA BARGAIN HAD BEEN MADE. SEVERAL ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO CONSTRUCT MODELS OF THE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT PROCESS, BUT TO DATE THESE HAVE EITHER BEEN TOO COMPLEX OR SO SIMPLIFIED AS TO NOT REFLECT THE REAL WORLD. THE WORKS OF FREEDMAN (1960), ROSS (1970), AND JOHNSTON AND TERSINE (1973) ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN THE PROCESS IN TERMS OF BENEFITS TO EACH SIDE. POSNER (1973) HIGHLIGHTS THE COST SAVINGS. LANDES (1971) STUDIES THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS BEHIND A DEMAND FOR A TRIAL. LACHMAN (1975) FOUND A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COURT RESOURCES AND NUMBER OF CASES ON THE DOCKET. ALL ASSUME THAT THE GOAL OF THE PROSECUTOR IS TO OBTAIN CONVICTIONS AND REDUCE CRIME LEVELS. FUTURE MODELS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE DYNAMICS OVER TIME, THE LIKELIHOOD OF WINNING AT TRIAL (WHICH IN THE PRESENT MODELS IS ASSUMED CONSTANT), AND THE CONFLICTING GOALS PRESENT IN REAL PLEA BARGAINING SITUATIONS. REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED.