IN 1972 IN GELBARD V. UNITED STATES, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT CONCLUDED THAT TITLE 3 OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968 CONFERRED ON GRAND JURY WITNESSES THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS BASED ON ILLEGALLY OBTAINED INFORMATION. HOWEVER, MANY FEDERAL COURTS ARE DENYING GRAND JURY WITNESSES EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHTS BY IMPOSING DIFFICULT EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS OF WITNESSES WHO ATTEMPT TO ASSERT THE RIGHT OR BY FAILING TO EXACT MEANINGFUL INQUIRY BY THE GOVERNMENT INTO WHETHER ITS INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES CONDUCTED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF THE WITNESS AND, IF SO, WHETHER THE AGENCIES COMPLIED WITH TITLE 3 SAFEGUARDS. TITLE 3, RELATED CASES PRECEDING THE GELBARD CASE, THE GELBARD DECISION ITSELF, AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS ARE EXAMINED. PROCEDURES THAT WILL GIVE MEANING TO THE GELBARD HOLDING AND TO THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO SECURE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR GRAND JURY WITNESSESS ARE SUGGESTED. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED--LKM)