THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 21.13 OF THE TEXAS PENAL CODE REPRESENTS AN ATTEMPT TO BALANCE THE CONFLICTING RIGHTS OF THE RAPE VICTIM AND THE ACCUSED. PRIOR TO 1975, THE LAW AS DEVELOPED BY THE COURTS CONSIDERED PRIOR SEXUAL CONDUCT TO BE RELEVANT TO THREE ISSUES: (1) POSSIBLE CONSENT TO INTERCOURSE BY THE VICTIM, (2) IMPEACHMENT OF THE VICTIM'S CREDIBILITY AS A WITNESS, AND (3) THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF THE INTERCOURSE. SECTION 21.13 SOUGHT TO IMPOSE STRICTER STANDARDS OF ADMISSIBILITY BY STATING THAT EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL CONDUCT COULD BE ADMITTED ONLY IF THE JUDGE FOUND THAT IT WAS 'MATERIAL TO A FACT AT ISSUE IN THE CASE.' THE LAW ALSO TRIED TO CONTROL THE USE OF INFLAMMATORY OR PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE, BUT THE TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS HAS NOT PROVIDED MEANINGFUL GUIDELINES ON THIS ISSUE. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF SECTION 21.13 ARE STILL UNKNOWN, BUT THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS ARE OFFERED: THE MISCONCEPTIONS THAT RAPE IS A CRIME OF SEXUAL SATISFACTION OR A FABRICATION OF A MALICIOUS FEMALE MUST BE RECOGNIZED SO THAT CONSENT CAN BE DETERMINED ONLY BY FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES REGARDING THE ALLEGED RAPE, EVIDENCE OF PRIOR SEXUAL CONDUCT MUST BE MATERIAL TO THE CASE AND NOT USED TO UNDERMINE THE VICTIM'S CREDIBILITY, AND THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO INTRODUCING EVIDENCE THAT IS NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE SOURCE OR ORIGIN OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED--MJM)