NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT ANON
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The only genuine, long-range solution for what has happened lies in an attack—mounted at every level—upon the conditions that breed despair and violence. All of us know what those conditions are: ignorance, discrimination, slums, poverty, disease, not enough jobs. We should attack these conditions—not because we are frightened by conflict, but because we are fired by conscience. We should attack them because there is simply no other way to achieve a decent and orderly society in America...
Foreword

This report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders responds to Executive Order 11365, issued by President Lyndon B. Johnson on July 29, 1967, and to the personal charge given to us by the President.

"Let your search," he said, "be free * * *. As best you can, find the truth and express it in your report."

We have sought to do so.

"This matter," he said, "is far, far too important for politics."

This was a bipartisan Commission and a nonpartisan effort.

"Only you," he said, "can do this job. Only if you * * * put your shoulders to the wheel can America hope for the kind of report it needs and will take to its heart."

This has been a working Commission.

To our staff, headed by David Ginsburg, Executive Director, to his deputy, Victor H. Palmieri, and to all those in government and private life who helped us, we are grateful.

Otto Kerner
Chairman

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Vice Chairman

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INTRODUCTION

The summer of 1967 again brought racial disorders to American cities, and with them shock, fear, and bewilderment to the Nation.

The worst came during a 2-week period in July, first in Newark and then in Detroit. Each set off a chain reaction in neighboring communities.

On July 28, 1967, the President of the United States established this Commission and directed us to answer three basic questions:

What happened?
Why did it happen?
What can be done to prevent it from happening again?

To respond to these questions, we have undertaken a broad range of studies and investigations. We have visited the riot cities; we have heard many witnesses; we have sought the counsel of experts across the country.

This is our basic conclusion: Our Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.

Reaction to last summer's disorders has quickened the movement and deepened the division. Discrimination and segregation have long permeated much of American life; they now threaten the future of every American.

This deepening racial division is not inevitable. The movement apart can be reversed. Choice is still possible. Our principal task is to define that choice and to press for a national resolution.

To pursue our present course will involve the continuing polarization of the American community and, ultimately, the destruction of basic democratic values.

The alternative is not blind repression or capitulation to lawlessness. It is the realization of common opportunities for all within a single society.

This alternative will require a commitment to national action—compassionate, massive, and sustained, backed by the resources of the most powerful and the richest nation on this earth. From every American it will require new attitudes, new understanding, and, above all, new will.

The vital needs of the Nation must be met; hard choices must be made, and, if necessary, new taxes enacted.

Violence cannot build a better society. Disruption and disorder nourish repression, not justice. They strike at the freedom of every citizen. The community cannot—it will not—tolerate coercion and mob rule.

Violence and destruction must be ended—in the streets of the ghetto and in the lives of people.

Segregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto a destructive environment totally unknown to most white Americans.

What white Americans have never fully understood—but what the Negro can never forget—is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.
It is time now to turn with all the purpose at our command to the single unbalked business of this Nation. It is time to make vigorous and effective for actions that will produce quick and visible progress. It is time to make the experiment and to give the experiment a thoroughgoing democracy to all citizens, male and female, white and black, Spanish-American, American Indian, and every minority group. Our recommendations embrace these basic principles:

1. To make present programs on a wide scale to the direction of this problem.

2. To start these programs for high impact in the immediate future in order to stem the gap between present and future need.

3. To make multiple new initiatives and experiments that can best be directed to the utmost, that now do install the ghettos and workers our society.

4. To be aware of the astounding and unprecedented levels of feeding and performance, but they neither need deeper nor demand more than the programs which can be set up. This is not to deny the impending need for national action and no higher priority for national action and no higher claims on the Nation's conscience.

We issue this report now, 5 months before the date called for by the President. Much remains that can be done. Continued study is essential.

As Communities we have worked together with a sense of the gravest urgency and have sought to compend everything differences exist among us. Some differ.

1. WHAT HAPPENED

Chapter 1—Profiles of Disorder

The report contains profiles of a selection of the disorders that took place during the summer of 1967. These profiles are designed to indicate how the disorder happened, who participated in them, and how local officials, police forces, and the National Guard responded. Illustrative excerpts follow:

Nevark

It was decided to stop, and we watched the scenes of the people into a nonexistent position. While Talbot prepared the attack, a call for a full investigation, would be made of the Smith incident, the other Nevada leaders began urging some of the individuals to go on the attack. Three persons joined the line of assault. October rolled along the sidewalk past the black housed building and into the arm of the city.

Detroit

A spirit of everyday soldiers was taking hold. To resist and destroy appeared to be more than ever it was. Detroit had been charged against the dinner table. The National Guard observers had been waiting for it. The Detroit residents were watching for it. They were looking for it. They were watching for it. They were watching for it.

New Brunswick

A series of events—events of the decorum of an old and institutions of a new order—occurred in front of the white house of the police station. The participants wanted to see the order.

Mayor (Patricia) Brannen went out on the steps of the station. Using a fire hose, she addressed the people and asked if she could give them an opportunity to contribute to the solution of the disorder. Later, Deputy Chief of Police, the Mayor, the Chief of Police, and the Mayor, she addressed the people again. Mrs. Brannen, then, the opinion, "We've had a chance to say what is going on here."

A demand was issued by the people in the crowd that all persons in the vicinity of the station be removed. Using a horse and an ambulance, the crowd was ordered to disperse. The New Brunswick riot had ended.

Chapter 2—Patterns of Disorder

The "typical" riot did not take place. The disorders of 1967 were unusual, irregular, complex, and unpredictable social processes. Like most human events, they did not unfold in a orderly sequence. However, an analysis of our survey information leads one to some dis­ charge the record.

In general:

The civil disorders of 1967 involved Negroes reacting against local symbols of white American society, authority, and property in Negro neighborhoods—rather than against white persons.

Of the 64 disorders reported during the first nine months of 1967, eight (13 percent) were minor in terms of violence and damage; 33 (52 percent) were serious but not major; 26 (41 percent) were minor in terms of violence and damage but major in terms of property damage.

In the 73 disorders studied by a Senate subcommittee, 81 (70 percent) of the death and 52 (64 percent) of the injuries occurred in disorders in which the disorderers assaulted police or white bystanders. In only 3 of the disorders was police or white bystander killed or injured in all the disorders were Negro civilians.

Initial damage estimates were greatly exaggerated.

In Detroit, newspaper damage estimates at first ranged from $100 million to $200 million, the highest recent estimate is $45 million. In Newark, early estimates at first ranged from $1 million to $15 million, 80 percent in inventory items.

In the 24 disorders in 23 cities which we surveyed:

The final incident before the outbreak of the disorder, and the violent incident, generally took place in the evening or at night in a place which was normal for many people: house, street, room, or bar.
surveyed. In many cases, these resulted in discussions of underlying grievances as well as the handling of the disturbances.

The typical rioter was a teenager or young adult, a typical resident of the city in which he rotated, a high school dropout, he was, essayed in, or had never been released than his nonriot Negro neighbor, and was usually unemployed or employed in a menial job. He was proud of his race, and although informed about politics, highly distrustful of the political system.

A Detroit survey revealed that approximately 11 percent of the total residents of two riot areas indicated participation in the rioting. 20 to 25 percent of those who participated themselves as "bystanders," over 16 percent indicated themselves as "counter-rioters" who urged rioters to "cool it," and the remaining 46 to 53 percent said they understood the rioters and did not participate. In a survey of Negro males between the ages of 15 and 35 residing in the disturbed area in Newark, about 45 percent identified themselves as rioters, and about 55 percent as "noninvolved."

Most rioters were young Negro males. Nearly 55 percent of arrestees were between 15 and 24 years of age; nearly 81 percent between 15 and 35.

In Detroit and Newark about 34 percent of the rioters were brought up in the North. In contrast, of the noninvolved, 30 percent in Detroit and 33 percent in Newark were brought up in the North.

Other rioters appeared to be seeking fuller participation in the riot or had the misplaced sense of political futility or injustice.

The proportion of Negroes in local government is substantially greater than the Negro proportion of population. Only three of the 20 riot cities had more than two Negro legislators; none had ever had a Negro mayor or city commissioner.

Although almost all cities had some form of formal grievance mechanism for handling citizen complaints, this typically was regarded by Negroes as ineffectual and was generally rejected.

Although specific grievances varied from city to city, at least 12 key identifiable grievances were identified as societal bases for the violence, continuing breakdown of interracial communication, and growth of white segregationist or black separatist groups.

The President directed the Commission to investigate "to what extent, if any, there has been planning or organization in any of the riots." To carry out this part of the President's charge, the Commission established a special investigative staff for the following tasks that more the general investigation of the riots: city.

The unit examined data collected by Federal agencies and government officials, including thousand documents supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, gathered and evaluated information from local and state law enforcement, deputized the riot and conducted its own field investigation in selected cities.

The Commission has found no evidence that all or any of the disorders or the incidents that led to them were planned or directed by any organization. "The Commission was unable to find any evidence that all or any of the disorders or the incidents that led to them were planned or directed by any organization."

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In this chapter we trace the patterns, identify the recurrent causes, and explore the methods of providing a perspective on the protest activities of the present era.

When we refer to the Negro's experience in America and the development of slavery as an institution. We show how persistent striving for equality in the face of rigidly instilled social, economic, and educational barriers, and --prejudicial mob violence. We portray the 1860-1890 period as one characterized by economic stagnation, apathy, and self-help, and their relationship to the current theme of Black Power. We conclude:

The Black Power advocates of today consciously feel that they are the same militant group in the Negro protest movement. Yet they have remained as the Negroes. A group with a historical mission, but without an adequate sense of the issue of integration and, by preaching separatism, a group with a history of economic stagnation and a lack of political representation.

Throughout the 20th century the Negro population of the United States has been moving steadily from rural areas to urban and from South to North and West. In 1910, 91 percent of the Nation's 9.8 million Negroes lived in the South and only 27 percent of American Negroes lived in cities of 5,000 or more. Between 1910 and 1955 the total Negro population increased from 9.8 to 22.5 million, and the number living in metropolitan areas rose from fivefold (from 2.6 million to 14.6 million). The number of Negroes has increased in the central city remained constant (from 18.0 to 9.7 million).

The migration from the South has resulted from the expectation of tens of thousands of new and highly paid employment, and urban ghettos. The structure of discrimination within the ghettos results in higher income and educational levels, and political power. Minority groups are still excluded from the political process, and have little or no representation in government. The Negro family of four. Over 40 percent of the nonwhites below the poverty level defined by the Social Security Administration were in 1965, 4.5 percent of the poor in the United States.

Chapter 6—The Formation of the Racial Ghetto

Although the 20th century is characterized by economic stagnation and a lack of political representation.

Chapter 7—Unemployment, Family Structure, and Social Disorganization

Unemployment is one of the major problems of the Negro community. In one city our low-income Negro district had 38 percent of the nonwhite population in the labor force, and 20 percent of the total Negro population of all age groups in the labor force. The problem of unemployment is not only a matter of economic deprivation, but also a matter of political power. Minority groups are still excluded from the political process, and have little or no representation in government. The Negro family of four. Over 40 percent of the nonwhites below the poverty level defined by the Social Security Administration were in 1965, 4.5 percent of the poor in the United States.

Chapter 8—Conditions of Life in the Racial Ghetto

A striking difference in environment results that of the middle-class Negro and white American profoundly influences the lives of residents of the ghetto. Crime rates, consistently higher than in other areas, are another matter of low visibility. For many Negroes, the streets of the inner city are their only avenue to work as personal representation, enabled the immigrant to make his personal representation, enabled the immigrant to make his political support. Ward-level political machines, which traded economic advantages for political support, wielded enormous power, as well as personal representation, enabled the immigrant to make his voice heard and his political power.

For the time the Negro arrived, these political machines were no longer as powerful, or as well equipped to generate jobs or other services. And in many cases were unwilling to share their remaining political power.

Cultural factors—Coming from societies with a low standard of living and a low standard of education. The Negro is often forced to take the low-paying, unskilled labor needed by industry. Unlike the immigrant, the Negro migrant found little opportunity in the city. The structure of discrimination within the ghettos results in higher income and educational levels, and political power. Minority groups are still excluded from the political process, and have little or no representation in government. The Negro family of four. Over 40 percent of the nonwhites below the poverty level defined by the Social Security Administration were in 1965, 4.5 percent of the poor in the United States.

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Lack of knowledge regarding credit purchasing, rental, or special rights for the disadvantaged. In many states, discrimination practices compound these difficulties. By allowing credit policies, distinctive individuals can escape from their ghettos and from poverty.

Chapter 9—Comparing the Immigrant and Negro Experience

In this chapter we address ourselves to a fundamental question: why do white Americans ask: Why have so many Negroes, unlike the European immigrants, been unable to escape from the ghettos and from poverty? We believe the following factors play a part:

The Negroes arrived, they gained an economic foothold by providing the unskilled labor needed by industry. The immigrant was a self-reliant individual, who arrived, they gained an economic foothold by providing the unskilled labor needed by industry. The immigrant was a self-reliant individual, who

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III. WHAT CAN BE DONE?

Chapter 10—The Community Response

Our investigation of the 1967 riot cities established that virtually every major episode of violence was foreshadowed by an accumulation of unresolved grievances and by widespread dissatisfaction among Negroes with the unsatisfiability of local government to respond.

Overcoming these conditions is essential for community support of law enforcement and civil order. City governments need new and more vital channels of communication to the residents of the ghetto; they need to improve their capacity to respond effectively to community needs before they become community grievances; and they need to provide opportunity for meaningful involvement of ghetto residents in shaping policies and programs which will affect the community.

The Commission recommends that local governments:

- Develop Neighborhood Action Task Forces as joint community-government efforts through which more effective communication can be achieved, and the delivery of city services to ghetto residents improved.
- Establish comprehensive grievance-resolution mechanisms in order to link all public agencies under public scrutiny.
- Bring the institutions of local government closer to the people they serve by establishing neighborhood councils for local, state, and Federal administrative and public service agencies.
- Expand opportunities for ghetto residents to participate in the formulation of local police policy and the implementation of programs affecting them through improved political representation, the establishment of meaningful channels for community action, expansion of legal services, and legislative hearings on police problems.

In this effort, city governments will require State and Federal support.

Recommendations include:

- State and Federal financial assistance for new and city communities that have the resources, mechanisms, staff, and other resources needed to respond effectively to Federal program initiatives.
- State cooperation in providing municipalities with the kind of professional guidance and assistance that they need.
- The maintenance of civil order cannot be left to the police alone. The police need guidance, as well as support, from mayors and other public officials. It is the responsibility of public officials to determine proper police policies, support adequate police standards for community action, expansion of legal services, and legislative hearings on police problems.

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Chapter 11—Police and the Community

The abrasive relationship between the police and the community may have been a major—and explosive—source of grievances, tension, and disorder. The blame must be shared by the total society.

The police are faced with demands for increased protection and services in the ghetto. Yet the aggressive patrol practices thought necessary to meet these demands themselves create tension and hostility. The resulting grievances have been further aggravated by the lack of effective mechanisms for handling complaints against the police. Special programs for better policing and community relations have been established, but these alone are not enough. Disputes with administration, with the guidance of public officials, and the support of the entire community, must take vigorous action to improve law enforcement and to decrease the potential for disorder.

The Commission recommends that city governments and police authorities:

- Review police operations in the ghetto to ensure proper conduct by police officers, and eliminate abusive practices.
- Provide more adequate police protection to ghetto residents to eliminate that which helps to spread the belief in the existence of a dual standard of law enforcement.
- Establish fair and effective mechanisms for handling grievances against the police and other municipal employees.
- Develop and adopt policy guidelines to assist officers in handling critical decisions in areas where police conduct can create tension.
- Develop and use innovative programs to improve widespread community support for law enforcement.
- Recruit more Negroes into the regular police force, and review personnel policies to insure fair promotion for Negro officers.
- Establish a "Community Service Officer" program to increase police contact with the appreciable portion of the ghetto population that is not served by regular police work. These junior officers would perform duties in ghetto neighborhoods, but would have less full police authority. The Federal Government should provide support equal to 90 percent of the costs of employing C.O.'s on the basis of 1 for every 10 Negro officers.

Chapter 12—Control of Disorder

Preserving civil peace is the first responsibility of government. Unlike the rule of law, our society will not look only to order but also to the environment essential to social and economic progress.

The maintenance of civil order cannot be left to the police alone. The police need guidance, as well as support, from mayors and other public officials. It is the responsibility of public officials to determine proper police policies, support adequate police standards for community action, expansion of legal services, and legislative hearings on police problems.

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Chapter 13—The Administration of Justice Under Emergency Conditions

In many of the cities which experienced disorders last summer, there were recurring breakdowns in the mechanisms of law enforcement, prosecutorial, and protective forces. These resulted mainly from long-standing structural deficiencies in criminal court systems, and from the failure of communities to anticipate and plan for the emergency demands of civil disorders.

To make these recommendations effective, the Commission recommends that city governments and police authorities:

- Establish emergency communications devices to permit rapid communication between police, public officials, and public officials with reliable information that may help to prevent the outbreak of a disorder and to institute effective control measures in the event a riot ensues.
- Develop continuing contacts with ghetto residents to make use of the forces for order which exist within the community.
- Establish machinery for neutralizing rumors, and enabling Negro leaders and residents to obtain the facts. Create special rumor duties to collect, evaluate, and dispel rumors that may lead to a civil disorder.
- Undertake reform of the lower courts so as to improve the quality of justice rendered under normal conditions.
- The Commission believes there is a grave danger that some communities may resort to the indiscriminate and excessive use of force. The harmful effects of, overreaction are intolerable. The Commission recommends minimum policies and procedures which will permit police departments with mass destruct­ weapon to use different techniques, machinery, and arms. They are designed to destroy, and not to protect. They are wrong in place in densely populated urban communities.

The Commission recommends that the Federal Government share in the financing of programs for improvement of police forces, both in their normal law enforcement missions as well as in their response to civil disorders.

To assist government authorities in planning their response to civil disorder, this report contains a Supplement on Control of Disorder. It deals with specific problems encountered during riot control operations, and includes:

- Assists in the present capabilities of police, National Guard and Army forces in control major riots, and recommends the establishment of a police training center.
- Recommended means by which the control operations of these forces may be coordinated with the response of other agencies, and the Federal Government's response to court-imposed integration.
- Recommendations for review and revision of Federal, state, and local laws to provide for the framework of controls over the use and deployment of armed forces and police officers.

Chapter 14—Damages: Repair and Compensation

The Commission recommends that the Federal Government:

- Assure the Federal Disaster Act—which now applies only to natural disasters—to permit Federal emergency food and medical assistance during disorders, and provide long-term economic assistance afterwards.
- With the cooperation of the states, create incentives for the private insurance industry to provide more adequate property insurance coverage in inner-city areas.

The Commission endorses the report of the National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Rented-Affected Areas: "Meeting the Insurance Crisis of our Cities."

Chapter 15—The News Media and the Disorders

In his charge to the commission, the President asked: "What effect did the media have on the riots?

The Commission determined that the answer to the President's question did not lie solely in the performance of the press, but rather in the entire communications network, and in the role of the Federal, state, and local governments.

A wide range of interviews with Government officials, law enforcement authorities, media personnel and other citizens, including ghetto residents, as well as a quantitative analysis of riot coverage and a special conference with industry representatives, leads us to conclude that:

- Despite instances of sensationalism, insensitivity and distortion, newspapers, radio and television tried on the whole to give a balanced, factual account of the riot scenes.
- Elements of the media's news media to portray accurately the scale and character of the violence that occurred last summer. The overall effect was, we believe, an exaggeration of both mood and event.

9
Improvements in the quality of ghetto life is essential. But this can be no more than an interim strategy. Progress in securing full employment also requires a substantial Negro movement out of the ghettos. The primary purpose of the single society, in which every citizen will be free to live and work according to his capabilities and desires, not his color.

Chapter 17—Recommendations for National Action

Introduction

No Americans—white or black—can escape the consequences of the continuing social and economic decay of our major cities. Only a commitment to national action on an unprecedented scale can shape a future compatible with the historic ideals of American society.

The Commission recommends that the Federal Government

• Undertake joint efforts with cities and states to consolidate existing manpower programs to avoid fragmentation and waste.

• Take immediate action to create 2 million new jobs over the next 3 years—1 million in the private sector— to absorb the hard-core unemployed and materially reduce the level of underemployment for all workers, black and white. We propose $300,000,000 in new manpower programs in the first year.

• Provide on-the-job training to both public and private employers with reimbursement to private employers for the extra costs of training the hard-core unemployed, by contract or by tax credit.

• Provide tax and other incentives to invest in rural as well as urban poverty areas in order to offer to the rural poor an alternative to migration.

• Take new and vigorous action to remove artificial barriers to employment and promotion, including not only racial discrimination but, in certain cases, age restrictions or lack of a high school diploma. We recommend legislation by Congress to end discrimination on the basis of age under the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. We urge all Federal agencies to establish programs to overcome barriers on grounds of color or race.

The Commission commends the recent public commitment of the National Council of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO to increase the hiring of Negro apprentices and to recruit Negro membership in apprenticeship programs. This commitment should be strengthened and implemented.

Education

Education in a democratic society must equip children to develop their potential and to participate fully in American life. For the community at large, the schools have discharged this responsibility well. But for many minorities, and particularly for the children of the ghettos, the schools have failed to provide the educational experience which could overcome the effects of discrimination and deprivation. This failure is one of the persistent sources of grievance.
The Welfare System

Our present system of public welfare is designed to save money instead of solving any tragically ended up doing neither. This system has two critical deficiencies:

First, it excludes large numbers of persons who are in great need, and who, if provided a decent level of support, might be able to become more productive and self-sufficient. No Federal funds are available for millions of unemployed and underemployed men and women who are neither aged but handicapped nor the parents of minor children.

Second, for those included, the system provides assistance well below the minimum necessary for a decent level of existence, and imposes restrictions that encourage continued dependency on welfare and undermine self-respect.

A welfare of statutory requirements and administrative practices and regulations operate to remind recipients that they are not members of the community, but rather wards of the State. Residence requirements prevent assistance to people in need who are near-arrived in the sense. Searches of recipients' homes violate privacy. Inadequate social services compound the problems.

The Commission recommends that the Federal Government:

- End all assistance to families who are not members of the American community, and who are thus not entitled to any Federal assistance.
- Provide for adequate social services, including medical care, education, and counseling.
- Reform the existing welfare system to:
  - Require all assistance to be provided in a form of standard housing, with the assistance to be paid directly to the landlord.
  - Require the landlord to keep the residence in good repair, and to be responsible for any damage or destruction.
  - Require the tenant to pay a reasonable rent, and to be responsible for any damage or destruction.
  - Require the tenant to provide proof of employment or training, and to be responsible for any damage or destruction.

Housing

A broad system of supplementation would involve substantially greater Federal expenditures than anything now contemplated. The cost will range widely depending on the level of need accepted as the "basic allowance" to individuals and families, and on the rate at which additional income above this level is taxed. Yet the deepening cycle of poverty and dependence on welfare can be broken, if the children of the poor can be given the opportunity to scale the wall that now separates them from the rest of society, the return on this investment will be great indeed.

More than three decades of fragmented and partially understood Federal housing programs, nearly 6 million subsidized housing units remain occupied in the United States.

The Commission recommends that the Federal Government:

- Expand and modify the rental assistance programs to make them not only more responsive to needs, but also more efficient in their use of resources.
- Increase the number of rental assistance units, and make them available to all income groups.
- Provide for the construction of new rental assistance units, and for the modernization of existing units.
- Increase the number of public housing units, and make them available to all income groups.
- Provide for the construction of new public housing units, and for the modernization of existing units.

To reach this goal we recommend:

- Expansion and modification of the low-rent supplement program to make it more responsive to needs, and to increase the number of units available.
- Increase the number of rental assistance units, and make them available to all income groups.
- Provide for the construction of new rental assistance units, and for the modernization of existing units.
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Conclusion

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- Increase the number of public housing units, and make them available to all income groups.
- Provide for the construction of new public housing units, and for the modernization of existing units.

These words come to our minds as we conclude this report.

We have provided an honest beginning. We have learned much. But we have uncovered no startling truths, no unmet challenges, no simple solutions. The destruction and the bitterness of racial disorder, the harsh penalties of black racism and white repression have remained unchanged.

It is time now to end the destruction and the violence that are in the street of the ghetto but in the lives of people.
Preface

The summer of 1967 brought racial disorder again to American cities, deepening the future residue of fear and threatening the future of all Americans. We are charged by the President with the responsibilities to examine this condition and to speak the truth as we see it. Two fundamental questions confront us:

How can we as a people end the resort to violence while we build a better society?

How can the Nation realize the promise of a single society—one nation indivisible—which yet remains unfilled?

Violence surely cannot build that society. Disruption and disorder will nourish not justice but repression. Those few who would destroy civil order and the rule of law seize at the freedom of every citizen. They must know that the community cannot and will not tolerate criminal and mob action.

We have worked together these past months with a sense of the greatest urgency. Although much remains that can be learned, we have determined to say now what we already have learned. We do this in the hope that the American public will understand the nature and gravity of the problem and that those who have power to act—at all levels of government and in all sections of the community—will listen and respond.

This sense of urgency has led us to consolidate in this single report the interim and final reports called for by the President. To accomplish this, it has been necessary to do without the benefit of some studies still under way which will not be completed for months to come. Certain of these studies—a 15-city survey of Negro and white attitudes, a special survey of attitudes of community leaders, elected officials, administrators and teachers, a report on the application of mediation techniques, and a further analysis of riot arrests—will be issued later, with other materials, as supplemental reports.

We believe that to wait until midsummer to present our findings and recommendations may be to forfeit whatever opportunity exists for this report to affect this year, the dangerous climate of tension and apprehension that prevails in our cities.
"We need to know the answers to three basic questions about these riots:

—What happened?
—Why did it happen?
—What can be done to prevent it from happening again and again?"

The three parts of this report offer answers to these questions.

Part I tells "What happened?" Chapter 1 is a profile of the 1967 disorders told through a narrative of the summer's events in 10 of the 23 cities surveyed by the Commission. Chapter 2 calls on data from all 23 cities to construct an analytical profile. Chapter 3 is the report of the Commission on the issue of conspiracy.

Part II responds to the question, "Why did it happen?" Early in our investigation it became clear that the disorders were not the result of contemporary conditions alone; Chapter 5 identifies some of the historical factors that are an essential part of the background of last summer's outbreaks. Chapters 6 through 9 deal with present conditions, examining the impact of ghetto formation, unemployment, and family structures, and conditions of life in the ghettos, and the differences between the Negro experience and that of other urban immigrant groups.

Part III contains our answer to the question, "What can be done?" Our recommendations begin with organizing the community to respond more effectively to ghetto needs and then proceed with police-community relations, control of disorders, the administration of justice under emergency conditions, compensation for property damage, the role of the news media, and conditions of life in the ghettos, and the differences between the Negro experience and that of other urban immigrant groups.

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Part I: What Happened?

Chapter 1
Profiles of Disorder

INTRODUCTION

The President directed the Commission to produce "a profile of the riots—of the rioters, of their environment, of their victims, of their causes and effects."

In response to this mandate the Commission constructed profiles of the riots in 10 of the 23 cities under investigation. Brief summaries of what were often conflicting views and perceptions of confusing episodes, they are, we believe, a fair and accurate picture of what happened.

From the profiles, we have sought to build a composite view of the riots as well as of the environment out of which they erupted.

* * * * *

The summer of 1967 was not the beginning of the current wave of disorders. Omens of violence had appeared much earlier.

1963-64

In 1963, serious disorders, involving both whites and Negroes, broke out in Birmingham, Savannah, Cambridge, Md., Chicago, and Philadelphia. Sometimes the mobs battled each other; more often they fought the police.

The most violent encounters took place in Birmingham. Police used dogs, firehoses, and cattle prods against marchers, many of whom were children. White racists shot at Negroes and bombed Negro residences. Negroes retaliated by burning white-owned businesses in Negro areas. On a quiet Sunday morning, a bomb exploded beneath a Negro church. Four young girls in a Sunday school class were killed.

In the spring of 1964, the arrest and conviction of civil rights demonstrators provoked violence in Jacksonville. A shot fired from a passing car killed a Negro woman. When a bomb threat forced evacuation of an all-Negro high school, the students chased policemen and firemen and burned the cars of newsmen. For the first time, Negroes used Molotov cocktails in setting fires.

Two weeks later, at a demonstration protesting school segregation in Cleveland, a bulldozer accidentally killed a young white minister. When police moved in to disperse a crowd composed primarily of Negroes, violence erupted.

In late June, white segregationists broke through police lines and attacked civil rights demonstrators in St. Augustine, Florida. In Philadelphia, Minutemen, law enforcement officers were implicated in the lynching of three civil rights workers. On July 10, Ku Klux Klansmen shot and killed a Negro U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, Lemuel Penn, as he was driving through Georgia.

On July 16, in New York City, several young Negroes walking to summer school classes became involved in a dispute with a white building superintendent. When an off-duty police lieutenant intervened, a 15-year-old boy attacked him with a knife. The officer shot and killed the boy.

A crowd of teenagers gathered and smashed store windows. Police arrived in force and dispersed the group.
The following day, the 1965 events, the police restored order. Not until almost 30 hours after the initial flareup did window smashing, looting, and arson begin. Yet the police utilized only a small part of their forces. Few persons were on hand the next morning when crowds gathered in the business district of Watts, 2 miles from the location of the original disturbance, and began looting. In the absence of police response, the looting became bolder and spread into other areas. pineapple and tomatoes. In 1965, when several persons were arrested, a white liquor store owner in Philadelphia, broken the store window, and began looting. In the absence of police response, the looting became bolder and spread into other areas.

In Chicago, as in other cities, the long-standing grievances of the Negro community needed only minor incidents to trigger violence. In 1965, when~/~e attempted to organize a rally in front of a private school, Principal Richard Washington, a black woman, was arrested. As a crowd gathered, she and other community leaders attempting to mediate between Negro residents and the police received little cooperation from municipal authorities. That evening the previous night's pattern of violence was repeated. Not until almost 30 hours after the initial flareup did window smashing, looting, and arson begin. Yet the police utilized only a small part of their forces. Few persons were on hand the next morning when crowds gathered in the business district of Watts, 2 miles from the location of the original disturbance, and began looting. In the absence of police response, the looting became bolder and spread into other areas. Pineapple and tomatoes. In 1965, when several persons were arrested, a white liquor store owner in Philadelphia, broken the store window, and began looting. In the absence of police response, the looting became bolder and spread into other areas.

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students and police broke down, crowds again began forming. Negroes stood on their heads, and shots were fired back at the police. On the fringes of the campus, several white youths aimed shots at a police patrol wagon.

A few days later, when police raided the home of several young Negro militants, they confiscated a half-dozen bottles prepared as Molotov cocktails.

About a month later, students at Jackson State College, in Jackson, Mississippi, were standing around after a political rally when two Negro police officers pursued a speeding car, driven by a Negro student, onto the campus. When the officers tried to arrest the driver, the students interfered. The police called for reinforcements, and a crowd of several hundred persons quickly gathered, and a few rocks were thrown.

On the following evening, an even larger crowd assembled outside the house in which a Negro student had drowned. Another was demonstrating at a junior high school to protest the condition of Negro education. When police attempted to disperse the crowd, sporadic gunshots reportedly came from the building.

For several hours, gunfire punctuated unsuccessful attempts by community leaders to negotiate a truce between the students and the police. When police finally left the street, the crowd had increased to 1,000 persons.

At 5:30 p.m., a block from the waterfront, a police car took up the pursuit. A short time later, when one of the police cars returned to the campus, it was met by rocks and bottles thrown by students. As police called for reinforcements, sporadic gunfire reportedly came from the dormitory. The police car was not able to get near the area to check the report. The officers could find no one on the streets.

A few minutes after 7 p.m., the Selective Enforcement Unit, tired and sun-parched, reported in from the scene, a chase began through and around the streets, preceded from yellow paper bags they were carrying. A .38 revolver and perhaps a shotgun were carried. A white officer, J. L. Calvert, was arrested from beneath the house. A white officer, J. L. Calvert, was arrested, and a crowd of several hundred persons quickly gathered, and a few rocks were thrown.

About a month before, police-community relations had been severely strained by the actions of a pair of white officers who were subsequently transferred to another beat.

When Officer Oates returned to the area, he attempted to convince the crowd to disperse by announcing that a complete investigation would be made into the shooting. He seemed to be making headway when a young woman came running down the street, screaming that the police had killed her brother. Her hysteria galvanized the crowd. Rock throwing began. Police cars driving into the area were stoned. The police, relying on a previous experience when, after withdrawal of their units, the crowd had dispersed, decided to send no more patrol cars into the vicinity. This time the maneuver did not work. From nearby houses around a 21-year-old student, D.W., a Vietnam veteran, who was seeking to stimulate further protest, had been employed to keep order at the races. D.W., he left, armed himself with a pistol, and returned.

In response to the report of a disturbance, two unmarked police cars with four officers arrived. Two of the officers questioned D.W., discovered he was armed with a pistol, and arrested him.

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As officers were leaving the scene, a thunderstorm broke. Several officers were injured. As police called for reinforcements, sporadic gunfire reportedly came from the building. A police car was not able to get near the area to check the report. The officers could find no one on the streets.

The men in the scout car had not, however, penetrated. The police car was not able to get near the area to check the report. The officers could find no one on the streets.

As the summer of 1967 approached, Americans, conditioned by 3 years of reports of riots, expected violence. But they had no answers to hard questions: What was causing the turmoil? Was it organized and, if so, by whom? Was there a pattern to the disorders?

I. TAMPA

On Sunday, June 11, 1967, Tampa, Fla., sweltered in the 94-degree heat. A humid wind ruffled the bay, where large crowds of persons watched the hydroplane races. Since early morning the police department's Selective Enforcement Unit, designed as a riot control squad, had been employed to keep order at the races. At 5:30 p.m., a block from the waterfront, a police photo supply warehouse was broken into. Forty-five minutes later, two police officers spotted three Negro youths as they walked near the State Building. When the youths called for the officers, they ducked into an alley. The officers gave chase. As they ran, the suspects left a trail of photographic equipment scattered from yellow paper bags they were carrying.

The officers transmitted a general broadcast over the police radio. As other officers arrived on the scene, a chase began through and around the streets, houses, and alley of the neighborhood. When Negro residents of the area heard the police were in the Central Park Village housing project became aware of the chase, they attempted to help the officers in locating the suspects.

R. C. Oates, one of 17 Negroes on the 511-man Tampa police force, spotted 19-year-old Martin Chambers,素oce, to have been riding one of the houses. Oates called for Chambers to surrender. Ignoring him, Chambers emerged running " ( [ ,) another beat.

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who had had his hands over his head and was trying to surrender.

The ambulance that had been summoned because looters were gathering near the event, bringing the bloody, critically injured youth grew increasingly agitated.

Finally, Officer Oates loaded Chambers into his car and drove him to the hospital. The youth died shortly thereafter.

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1 Throughout the report, in the presentation of statistics Negro is used interchangeably with nonte. Whatever available figures were used to depict the Negro population, quite possibly, figures are those of the 1960 census. Sources are the U.S. Bureau of the Census and other Government agencies, and, in a few instances, special studies.
The police department was slow to react. Although warning shots were made to him, the police did not return the fire. Police announced a search warrant for the man most likely to carry weight with the rioters.

At 11:30 p.m., a recall order, issued earlier by the police department, began to bring officers back into the area. By this time, the streets in the vicinity of the housing project were lighted by the flames of burning buildings.

A young white couple, driving along the expressway, was startled by the fires.决定 to investigate, they took the off-ramp into the midst of the riot. The car was swarmed over. Its windows were smashed, and the young couple were booted and hissed. The meeting broke up without concrete results. Nevertheless, the Governor believed it had enabled the residents to let off steam. That evening, as National Guard troops began to spread to several other establishments from the three stores in which they had originally been set, no resistance was met. Control was soon reestablished.

Driving along the expressway, a young white couple, a Negro fruit-picker from Arkansas, was as surprised by the riot as Mr. and Mrs. C. D. Pushing toward the station wagon in which the young woman was trapped, he interposed himself between her and the mob. Although rocks and beer cans smashed the windows, she was able to drive off. J. C. pushed through to where the white man lay. With the looters and jeers of rioting youths ringing in his ears, J. C. helped him, also, to escape.

The officers did not return the fire. Police announced from a sound car that anyone caught armed would be subdued. Playing on the expressway, a Negro woman was trapped, he interposed himself between her and the mob. Although rocks and beer cans smashed the windows, she was able to drive off. J. C. pushed through to where the white man lay. With the looters and jeers of rioting youths ringing in his ears, J. C. helped him, also, to escape.

Late in the afternoon, Governor Kirk met with the residents at a school in the Central Park Village area. It was a tense meeting. Most speakers, whether white or Negro, were booted and hissed. The meeting broke up without concrete results. Nevertheless, the Governor believed it had enabled the residents to let off steam. That evening, as National Guard troops began to spread to several other establishments from the three stores in which they had originally been set, no resistance was met. Control was soon reestablished.

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II. CINCINNATI

On Monday, June 12, before order had been re-established in Tampa, trouble erupted 480 miles away in Cincinnati.

Beginning in October 1965, assaults on middle-aged white women, several of whom were murdered, had generated an atmosphere of fear. When the "Cincinnati Strangler" was tentatively identified as a Negro, a new element of tension was injected into relations between the races. In December 1966, a Negro jazz musician named Postell Wasley was arrested and charged with one of the murders. In May of 1967, he was convicted and sentenced to death. Two of the principal witnesses against Wasley were Negroes. Nevertheless, many Ne-
crowds felt that because of the charged atmosphere, they had not resolved a fair trial.

They were further aroused when, at about the same time, a Jackson, Miss., police officer was killed by a shotgun blast in the death of his girlfriend, received a suspended sentence. Although the cases were similar, there was talk in the Negro community that the difference in the sentences demonstrated a double standard of justice for white and for black.

A drive began in the Negro community to raise funds for an appeal. Luskin's cousin, Peter Fraken, began writing the streets on behalf of this appeal carrying a sandwich board declaring: "Cincinnati Guilty—Luskin Innocent." After warning him several times, police arrested Fraken on a charge of blocking pedestrian traffic.

The city viewed his arrest as evidence of police harassment, similar to the apparently selective enforcement of the segregation ordinance. Between January 1966, and June 1967, 170 of some 240 persons arrested under the ordinance were Negro.

Fraken was arrested at 12:35 a.m. on Sunday, June 11. That evening, concurrent with the commencement of a Negro Baptist convention, it was announced to one of the churches that a meeting to protest the Fraken arrest and the antiblitzing ordinance would be held the following night on the grounds of a junior high school in the Avondale District.

Part of the significance of such a protest meeting lay in the context of past events. Without the city's realizing what was occurring, over the years protest through political and nonviolent channels had become increasingly difficult for Negroes. Young, militant Negroes, reneging on their parents' dreams, had found the established formal channels of protest inadequate. The city's Northside Police Department, with a force of 242 men, was a symbol of this enforcement policy.

Although the city's Negro population had been rising quite steadily--in 1967, 135,000 out of the city's 500,000 residents were Negroes--there was only one Negro on the city council. In the 1950's with a far smaller Negro population, there had been two. Negroes attributed this dilution of the Negro vote through abdication of the proportional representation system of electing the nine councilmen.

Although, by 1967, 40 percent of the schoolchildren were Negro, there was only one Negro on the board of education, and the leaders of various city commissions, only three or four were Negro.

Under the leadership of the NAACP, picketing, to protest lack of recognition in building trades unions, took place at the construction site of a new city convention hall. It produced no results. When the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, who had been one of the leaders of the Birmingham demonstrations of 1963, staged a protest against alleged discriminatory practices at the county hospital, he and his followers were arrested and convicted of trespassing.

Traditional Negro leaders drawn to the middle-class lost influence in the city produced petty results. In the spring of 1967, a group of 13 white and 14 Negro business owners, calling themselves the Committee of 28, talking about 2,000 job openings for young Negroes. Only 65 materialized. Almost one out of every eight Circuit who were arrested, had been on the streets a few hours earlier, when a Ku Klux Klanman had been attracted to the scene of a speech by Studebaker Michael, a Negro, re-acting on the heavy police patrolling, had been at the center of a phallic display and attempted to overturn it. On Monday, June 12, the department decided to withhold its men from the immediate area of the disturbance.

The police, alerted to the possibility of a disturbance, mobilized. However, the police were wary of backing off, so some Negro militants had complained, an inviting factor. Some months earlier, when an incident of a Negro Baptist convention, it was announced one of the churches that a meeting to protest the Fraken arrest and the antiblitzing ordinance would be held the following night on the grounds of a junior high school in the Avondale District.

It appeared for a time as if this policy might be working. Near the end of the rally, however, a Negro real estate agent broke area to defend the police and the antiblitzing ordinance. The crowd, including the youngsters who had had the encounter with the police officers, in the Avondale section--"worked the bell"--to help the police. When the meeting broke up, a whistle was hurled through the window of a nearby church. A small fire was set in the street. A Molotov cocktail was thrown through the window of a drug store.

The police were able to react quickly. There was only one major confrontation between them and the mob; little resistance was offered.

Although windows were broken in some two dozen stores, no serious injuries or property losses were reported. There were 14 arrests, some unrelated to the demonstration; some of them were white. Among those arrested was a community worker, now staff member, at the Cincinnati Police Community Relations Center. When he went to the area to help get people off the streets, he was arrested and charged with carrying a concealed weapon.

Late in the afternoon, the youths began to intermingle with deliveries being made by white truckers. Dr. Brown, president of the local NAACP chapter, was notified. Dr. Brown asked his colleague, the director of the Opportunities Industrialization Center, to go and try to calm the youngsters. Dr. Reid found several who he knew, and one of them--he is a boy.

They were drawing up plans for a meeting with the merchants of the Avondale area when word came of a disturbance in a nearby drainage. Several of the youths left the meeting and rushed over to the store. Dr. Reid followed them. The owner of the store was complaining to the police that the earlier youths had interfered with his business; he declared that he wasn't going to stand for it.

Dr. Reid was attempting to mediate when a police sergeant arrived and asked the officer what was going on. One allegedly replied that they had been called in on a complaint from the police that earlier the youths had headed for the Mississippi Avenue, a Negro residential area. City leaders did not want to give stature to the militants by recognizing the meeting that took place.

The next morning, a Judge of the Municipal Court, among the persons arrested. Police were charging most white youth with disorderly conduct, for which they were fined $5. Among those arrested was a young adult, beginning to gather in the Avondale section. At 9:40 p.m., a crowd, consisting mostly of teenagers and young adults, began to gather in the Avondale District. When, after a short time, no one appeared to give direction, they began to mill about.

At 9:40 p.m., following a request for aid to surrounding communities, Mayor Bachrach placed a call to the Governor asking for mobilization of the National Guard.

At 9:50 a.m., following a request for aid surrounding the city, Mayor Bachrach placed a call to the Governor asking for mobilization of the National Guard.

Although many reports say that Molotov cocktails, cars being burned, and windows being broken were received during the first night of riots, it is not possible to determine its scope.

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The fire department log listed four as having caused major damage.

On Tuesday, the city council held an open session. The chamber was jampacked with Negro residents, many of whom gave vociferous support as their spokesmen criticized the city administration. When the audience became unruly, a detail of National Guardsmen was stationed outside the council chamber. Their presence resulted in a misunderstanding, causing many of the Negros to walk out and the meeting to end.

Wednesday night, it was virtually no report of riotous activity until 9 p.m., when scattered incidents of violence again began to take place. One person was injured by a gunshot.

Despite fears of a clash between Negros and SDS—white Southern Appalachian migrants whose economic conditions paralleled those of Negros—such a clash was averted.

Negroes were arriving in the city on Thursday, attempting to capitalize on the discontent by presenting a list of 20 demands. Their principal effect would have been total removal of all white persons, whatever their capacity, from the ghetto area. Demand No. 18 stated that "all Negroes over 16 years of age . . . any white proposal or white representatives objected to by black representatives must be rejected automatically by black representatives." No. 20 demanded a veto power over police officers patrolling the community.

His appearance had no galvanizing effect. Although scattered incidents occurred for 3 days after the arrival of the National Guard, the disorder never returned to its earlier intensity.

Of 63 reported injuries, 12 were serious enough to require hospitalization; 56 of the persons injured were white. Most of the injuries resulted from thrown objects or glass splinters. Of the 107 persons arrested Tuesday night, when the main disturbance took place, 75 were 21 year old or younger. Of the total of 404 persons arrested, 134 were juveniles, and 270 were ages of age or younger. Of the adults arrested, 29 percent were unemployed.

In Atlanta

On Saturday, June 17, as the National Guard was being withdrawn from Cincinnatti, the same type of minor police arrest that had initiated the Cincinnatti riot took place in Atlanta.

Rapid industrialization following World War II, coupled with annexations that quadrupled the area of the city, had made Atlanta a vigorous and booming community. Pragmatic business and political leaders worked out in many cases a system of the moderate strong

of the South Deep.

Nevertheless, despite acceptance, in principle, of some Negro requests, the fact that the city is the headquarters both for civil rights organization and segregationist elements created a strong and ever-increasing potential for conflict.

The rapidly growing Negro population, which, by the summer of 1967 had reached an estimated 44 percent, and was scattered in several ghettos throughout the city, maintained constant pressure on surrounding white residential areas. Some real estate agents engaged in "block-busting tactics" to stimulate panic sales by white homeowners. The city police were continually on the alert to maintain order and apprehend civil rights and white supremacist organizations from entering into violent conflict.

In September 1966, following a fatal shooting by a police officer in a white neighborhood, a 24-year-old Negro who was running arrest, only the dramatic ghetto appearance of Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr., had avered a riot.

Boasting that Atlanta had the largest KKK membership in the country, the Klan, on June 4, 1967, marshalled through one of the poorer Negro sections.

A massive police escort prevented a racial clash.

According to Mayor Allen, 25 percent of municipal employees hired in 1967 were Negroes, bringing their proportion of the city work force to 28 percent. Of 390 police department employees, 83 are Negro—a higher proportion of Negroes than in most major city police departments in the Nation.

To the Negro community, however, it appeared that the progress made served only to reduce the level of inequity. Equal conditions for blacks and whites remained a hope for the future. Different pay scales for black and white municipal employees performing the same job had been only recently eliminated. The economic and educational gap between the black and white populations may, in fact, have been increasing. The average white Atlantan was a high school graduate; the average Negro Atlantan had not completed the eighth grade.

In 1960, the median income of a Negro family was less than half of the white's $6,500, with 30 percent of Negro families earning less than $5,000 a year. Fifty percent of the men worked in unskilled jobs, and many more white persons than them, 7.9 percent as against 4.9 percent of the respective white force, held well-paying, white-collar jobs.

Living on marginal incomes in cramped and deteriorating quarters—one-third of the housing was overcrowded and more than half substandard—families

were breaking up at an increasing rate. In approximately four out of every 25 Negro homes the father was the lone wage earner. In the case of families living in public housing projects, the results were even more profound. Negro families were continually on the alert to keep marchers and brown people out of the city and to keep Negro school officials and civil rights organizations out of the classrooms. The small number of elected Negro officials appeared to be due to a system in which all Negroes are elected at large, but represent specific wards, and are elected in the wards from which they are elected. Because of the quilted ward system, Negro candidates were unable to meet the residency requirements for running from predominantly Negro wards. Since, however, candidates are dependent upon the city-wide vote for election, and the city has a white majority, few Negroes had been able to attain office.

A decision was made by the Dixie Hills residents to organize committees and hold a protest meeting the next night.

The headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) is located in Atlanta. Its former president, Stokely Carmichael, wearing a green Malcolm X sweatshirt, appeared, together with several students. Stokely Carmichael asked why there were so many police cars in the area. Informers said that there were none. The young Negro, wearing a green Malcolm X sweatshirt, appeared; together with the young Negro, wearing a green Malcolm X sweatshirt, appeared; together with the young Negro, wearing a green Malcolm X sweatshirt, appeared; together with a 19-year-old Negro who had been arrested on a disorder charge.

Shortly after 8 p.m. on Saturday, June 17, a young Negro, E. W., carrying a can of beer, attempted to enter the Flamingo Grill in the Dixie Hills Shopping Center. When a Negro security guard told the youth he could not enter, a scuffle ensued. Police officers were called to the guard's aid. E. W. received a blow on his 19-year-old sister, who flailed away at the officers with her purse. Another 19-year-old Negro youth entered the fray. All Negro officers were arrested.

Although some 200 to 300 persons had been drawn to the scene of the incident, when police asked them to disperse, they complied.

Because the area is isolated from the city in terms of facilities, recreation, and transportation, and there are few recreational facilities, the shopping center is a natural gathering place.

The next night, Sunday, an even bigger crowd was on hand.

As they mingled, residents discussed their grievances. There were bitter complaints about their inability to get the city government to correct conditions and make improvements.

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Although some 200 to 300 persons had been drawn to the scene of the incident, when police asked them to disperse, they complied.
Reinforced by approximately 60 to 70 officers, the police, firing over the heads of the crowd, quickly re-
gained control. Of the 13,600 persons arrested, six were
18 years of age or younger; one was in his thirties. The
next day city equipment appeared in the area to begin
work on the long-delayed playgrounds and other
projects demanded by the citizens. It was announced that
a Negro youth patrol would be established along the
lines of the Tampa White Hats.
SNCC responded that volunteers for the patrol
would be selecting "their black brother out" and would be
viewed as "black traitors," to be dealt with in the
"manner we see fit." Nevertheless, during the course of
the summer, the 200 youth participating in the corps
played an important role in preventing a serious out­
break of police belief that establishment of the youth corps became a major factor in improving police-
community relations.

Throughout the area residents were called for
Tuesday evening. At its conclusion, 200 protesters were
met by 50 police officers. As two police officers
chased several boys down the street, a cherry bomb or
incendiary device exploded at the officers' feet. In ...
sponse, several shots were fired from a group of police
consisting mostly of Negro officers. The discharge from
a shotgun struck in the midst of several persons sitting
on the front porch of a house. A 46-year-old man who
was killed; a 9-year-old boy was critically injured.

Because of the efforts of neighborhood and anti­
poverty workers who circulated through the area, and
the later appearance of Mayor Allen, no further vio-
ence ensued.

When H. "Rain" Brown, who had returned to the
city that afternoon, went to other Negro areas in an
attempt to initiate a demonstration against the shoot­
ing of the Negroes on the porch, he met with no re­

Within the next few days, a petition was drawn up
by State Senator Leroy Johnson and other moderate
Negro leaders demanding that Stokely Carmichael get
out of the community and allow the people to handle
their own affairs. It was signed by more than 1,000
persons in the Dixie Hills area.

IV. NEWARK

The last outburst in Atlanta occurred on Tuesday
night, June 20. That same night, in Newark, N.J., a
tumultuous meeting of the planning board took place.
Until 4 a.m., speaker after speaker from the Negro
ghetto arose to denounce the city's intent to turn over
50 acres in the heart of the central ward as a site
for the State's new medical and dental college.

A large opposition in the city administration
by vocal black residents had paralyzed both the plan­
ing board and the board of education. Tension had
been building steadily throughout the northern New-
Jersey area that, in the first week of June, Col. David
Kelly, head of the state police, had met with municipal
police chiefs to draw up plans for state police suppc·rt
of city police wherever a riot developed. Nowhere was
the situation worse than in Newark.

Founded in 1666, the city, part of the Greater New
York City port complex, rises from the salt marshes
of the Passaic River. Although in 1897 Newark's population of 400,000 still ranked it 30th among
American municipalities, for the past 20 years the white middle class had been deserting the city for
the suburbs.

In the late 1950's, the suburbs had become a rout.
Between 1960 and 1967, the city lost a net total of
approximately 13,000 people. Replacing them in the
vast areas of dilapidated housing where living condi-
tions, according to a prominent member of the County
Bar Association, were so bad that "people would be
kinder to their pets," were Negro migrants, Cubans,
and Puerto Ricans. In 6 years, the city switched from
65 percent white to 32 percent Negro and 10 percent
Rican and Cuban.

The white population, nevertheless, retained political
control of the city. On both the city council and the
board of education, seven of nine members were white.
In other key boards, the disparity was equal or greater.

In the central ward, where the medical college con-
troversy raged, the Negro constituents and their white
councilman found themselves on opposite sides of
almost every crucial issue.

The municipal administration lacked the ability
to respond quickly enough to navigate the swiftly
changing currents. Even had it had great astuteness,
it would have lacked the financial resources to affect
significantly the course of events.

In 1962, seven-term Congressman Hugh Addonizio
had forged an Italian-Negro coalition to overthrow
time Irish control of the city hall. A liberal in Congress, Addonizio, when he became mayor, had
opened his door to all people. Negroes, who had been excluded from the previous administration, were
brought into the government. The police department
was integrated.

Nevertheless, progress was slow. As the Negro popu-
lation increased, more and more of the politically ori-
ented found the new system patronizing and uncomfortable. The Negro Italian coalition began to develop strains
over the issue of the police. The police were largely
Italian, the persons they arrested were largely Negro.
Community leaders agreed that, as in many police forces, there was a small minority of officers who abused
their responsibility. This gave credibility to the cities of
"brutality," voiced periodically by Negro youths.

In 1965, Mayor Addonizio, acknowledging that there
was a "group of misguided individuals" in the police
department, declared that "It is vital to establish con-
siderable doubt among the public, that charges of
alleged police brutality will be thoroughly investigated
and the appropriate legal or punitive action be taken if
the charges are found to be substantiated." The mayor
had set up two police review boards, and the other by the police, who
adamantly opposed it, the mayor decided to transfer
"the control and investigation of complaints of police
brutality out of the hands of both the police and the
public and into the hands of an agency that all can
trust-the Federal Bureau of Investigation," and to set
up "the control and investigation of any charges of police
misconduct directly to the Prosecutor's office." How­ever, the FBI concluded that there had been a violation of a
person's federal civil rights. No complaint was ever heard
of.

So there was much redress for other complaints.
The city had no money with which to redress them.
The city had already reached its legal bonding limit,
yet expenditures continued to outstrip income. Health
and welfare costs, per capita, were 20 times as great
as for some of the surrounding communities. Cramped
by this small land area of 23.6 square miles-one-third
of which was taken up by Newark Airport and unus­
able marshland-and surrounded by independent jur-
dictions, the city had nowhere to expand.

The title property was contracted, as cleared for
urban renewal, lay fallow year after year. Property
taxes had been increased, perhaps, to the point of
diminishing return. By the fall of 1967, they were
to be raised to $1.00 per $100. Department of
buildings and public and into the

In 1962, Secretary of the Army Robert Carvin, COD, official, tried to calm the crowd in Newark, July 1967

Under such conditions a major segment of the Negro
population became increasingly militant. Large-scale
exclusion from positions of traditional political power,
Negroes, tutored by a militant of traditional social activi-
tists who had moved into the city in the early 1960's,
make up of the antipoverty program, in which poor
people were guaranteed representation, as a political
springboard. This led to friction between the United
Community Corporation, the agency that administered
the antipoverty program, and the mayor's administration.
When it became known that the secretary of the board of
towards ending the militancy,

3 The legal tax rate is $76.76 per $100 of market value.
However, because of inflation, a guideline of 85.27 percent
of market value is used in assessing, reducing the true tax
rate to $66.17 per $100.
proposed for the position the city's budget director, a Negro with a master's degree in accounting. The reason, however, had already nominated a white man. Since the white man had only a high school education, and at least 70 percent of the children in the school system were Negro, the issue was one of who was to obtain the secretarial position, an important and powerful position, quickly became a focal issue.

Jointed with the issue of the 150-acre medical school site, the area of which had been expanded to include the original request—an expansion regarded by the militants as an effort to dilute black political power by moving out Negro residents—the board of education battle resulted in a confrontation between the mayor and the militants. Both sides refused to alter their positions.

I?
Newark a!t,rmath, July 1967
short period of time the disorder ran its course.
The night before, Spina had arrived at the Fourth
Negro leaders to discuss measures to defuse the situa­
tion, he agreed to appoint the first Negro police cap­
tain, and announced that he would set up a panel of
citizens to investigate the Smith arrest. To one civil
rights leader, this sounded like "the playback of a
record," and he walked out. Other observers reported
that the mayor seemed unaware of the seriousness of
the disturbance. At 10:30, with the crowd gathered.
A picket line was formed to march in front of the
police station. Between 7 and 7:30 p.m., James Threatt,
executive director of the Newark Human Rights Com­
mis sion, arrived to announce to the people the decision
of the mayor to form a citizens group to investigate the
Smith incident, and to elevate a Negro to the rank of
captain.
The response from the loosely milling mass of people
was derisive. One younger shouted "Black Power!"
shots were thrown at Threatt, a Negro. The barrage
of insults that followed placed the police station under
siege.
After the barrage had continued for some minutes,
police radio dispatch centers began requesting police
officers to respond. According to witnesses, there was little restraint of language or ac­
tion by either side. A number of police officers and
Negroes were injured.
As no the night before, once the people had been
dispersed, reports of looting began to come in. Soon
the glow of the first fire was seen.
Without enough men to establish control, the police
set up a perimeter around a 2-mile stretch of Spring­
field Avenue, one of the principal business districts,
where bands of youths ran up and down smashing
windows. Grocery and liquor stores, clothing and furni­
ture stores, drugstores and cleaners, appliance stores
and pawnshops were the principal targets. Periodically,
police officers would appear and fire their weapons
over the heads of looters and rioters. Laden with stolen
goods, people began returning to the housing projects.
Near midnight, activity appeared to taper off. The
mayor told reporters the city had turned the corner.
As news of the disturbances had spread, however,
people had flocked into the streets. At a saw stores
being broken into with impunity, many bowed to
terrorism and joined the looting.
Without the necessary personnel to manage mass ar­
rests, police were shooting into the air to clear streets.
A Negro boy was wounded by a 22 caliber bullet
said to have been fired by a white man riding in a car.
Guns were reported stolen from a Sears, Roebuck store.
Looting, fires, and gunfire were reported from a widening area. Between 2 and 3:30 a.m. on Friday,
July 14, the mayor decided to request Gov. Richard J.
Hughes to dispatch the state police and National
Guard troops. The first elements of the state police ar­
rived with a sizable contingent before dawn.
During the morning the Governor and the mayor,
together with the police and National Guard officers,
made a reconnaissance of the area. The police escort
guarding the officers arrested looters as they went. By
early afternoon the National Guard had set up 137
roadblocks, and state police and riot teams were
beginning to achieve control. Command of anti-riot
operations was taken over by the Governor, who de­
creed a "hard line" in putting down the riot.
As a result of technical difficulties, such as the fact
that the city and state police did not operate on the
same radio wave-lengths, the three-way command
structure—city police, state police and National
Guard—worked poorly.
At 5:30 p.m. that afternoon, the family of Mrs. D.
J. was standing near the upstairs windows of their
apartment, watching looters run in and out of a furni­
ture store on Springfield Avenue. Three carbids of

Newark during July 1967 disorder
Newark, July 1967

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police rounded the corner. As the police yelled at the looters, they began running.

The police officers opened fire. A bullet smashed the kitchen window in Mrs. D. J.'s apartment. A moment later she heard a cry from the bedroom. Her 8-year-old daughter, Debbie, came running into the room: "Blood looters, they began running.

Later she heard a cry from the bedroom. Her face was streaming down the left side of her face: the bullet in the hospital. She lost the sight of her left eye and the hearing in her left ear.

With him were his two brothers and his 73-year-old stepfather, Isaac Harrison. About 60 persons had been watching the looting. As the police arrived, Harrison, followed by the family, headed toward the front steps of the building. Finally, as the firing died down, Morris jammed with 60 to 70 frightened, angry Negroes.

"Tell the black bastards to stop shooting at us," the sergeant yelled. "You shut up, there's a sniper on the roof," the sergeant replied.

"You shut up, there's a sniper on the roof," the sergeant yelled.

A short time later, at approximately 5 p.m., in the same vicinity, a police detective was killed by a small caliber bullet. The origin of the shot could not be determined. Later during the riot, a fireman was killed by a .30 caliber bullet.

Snipers were blamed for the deaths of both.

At 5:30 p.m., on Beacon Street, W. F. told J. S., whose Pontiac he had taken to the station for inspection, that his front brake needed fixing. J. S., who had just returned from work, went to the car which was parked in the street, jacked up the front end, took the wheel off, and got under the car.

The street was quiet. More than a dozen persons were sitting on porches, walking about, or shopping. No one heard any shots. Suddenly several state troopers appeared at the corner of Springfield and Beacon. J. S. was startled by a shot clanging into the side of the garbage can next to his car. As he looked up he saw a state trooper with his rifle pointed at him. The next shot struck him in the right side.

At almost the same instant, K. G., standing on a porch, was struck in the right eye by a bullet. Both he and J. S. were critically injured.

At 6 p.m., Mrs. L. M. bundled her husband, her husband's brother, and her four sons into the family car to drive to a restaurant for dinner. On the return trip her husband, who was driving, panicked as he approached a National Guard roadblock. He slowed the car, then quickly swerved around. A shot rang out. When the family reached home, everyone began piling out of the car. Ten-year-old Eddie failed to move. Shot through the head, he was dead.

Although, by nightfall, most of the looting and burning had ended, reports of sniper fire increased. The fire was, according to New Jersey National Guard reports, "deliberate or otherwise.

James F. Cantwell, Chief of Staff of the New Jersey National Guard, testified before an Armed Services Subcommittee of the House of Representatives that "there was too much firing initially against snipers..." because of "confusion when we were finally called on for help and our thinking of it as a military action."

"As a matter of fact," Director of Police Spina told the Commission, "down in the Springfield Avenue area it was everywhere. In my opinion, Guardsmen were firing upon police and police were firing back at them. I really don't believe there was as much sniping as we thought. We have since compiled statistics indicating that there were 39 specified instances of sniping."

Several problems contributed to the misconceptions regarding snipers: the lack of communications; the fact that one shot might be reported half a dozen times by half a dozen different persons as it caromed and echoed a mile or more through the city; the fact that the National Guard troops lacked riot training. They were, said a police official, "young and very scared," and had little contact with Negroes.

Within the Guard itself contact with Negroes had been limited. Although, in 1949, out of a force of 12,529 men there had been 1,183 Negroes, following the integration of the Guard in the 1950's the number had declined until, by July of 1967, there were 303 Negroes in a force of 17,529 men.

On Saturday, July 15, Spina received a report of snipers in a housing project. When he arrived he saw approximately 100 National Guardmen and police officers crouching behind vehicles, hiding in corners and lying on the ground around the edge of the courtyard.

Since everything appeared quiet and it was broad daylight, Spina walked directly down the middle of the street. Nothing happened. As he came to the last building of the complex, he heard a shot. All around him the troopers jumped, believing themselves to be under sniper fire. A moment later a young Guardsman ran from behind a building. The director of police went over and asked him if he had fired the shot. The soldier said no, he had fired to warn a man away from a window, that his orders were to keep everyone away from windows.

Spina said he told the soldier: "Do you know what you just did? You have now created a state of hysteria. Every Guardsman up and down this street and every state policeman and every city policeman that is present thinks that somebody just fired a shot and that it is probably a sniper."

A short time later more "gunshots" were heard. Investigating, Spina came upon a Puerto Rican sitting on a wall. In reply to a question as to whether he knew "where the firing is coming from?" he said: "That's no firing. That's fireworks. If you look up to the fourth floor, you will see the people who are throwing down these cherry bombs."

By this time, four trucksloads of National Guardsmen had arrived and troopers and policemen were again crowned everywhere, looking for a sniper. The director of police remained at the scene for three hours, and the only shot fired was the one by the guardian.
A number of eye witnesses, at varying times and places, reported seeing bottles thrown from upper story windows. As those would land at the feet of an officer he would turn and fire. Thereupon, other officers would break and enter the street and the street would join in.

In order to protect his property, B. W. W., the owner of a Chinese laundry, had placed a sign saying "Blind Brother" in his window. Between 1 and 1:30 a.m. on Sunday, July 16, his, mother, wife, and brother, were watching television in the back room of the street. The neighborhood had been quiet. Suddenly, B. W. W. heard the sound of jars, then shots.

Going to an upstairs window he was able to look out into the street. There he observed several jeeps, from which soldiers and state troopers were firing into stores that had "Soul Brother" signs in the windows.

During the course of three nights, according to drama a sharp-eyed eye, the law enforcement officers shot into and smashed windows of businesses that contained signs saying "Soul Brother." At 11 p.m., on Sunday, July 16, Mrs. Lucille Pugh looked out of the window to see if the streets were clear. She then shot her 11-year-old son, Michael, to take the garbage out. As he reached the street and was illuminated by a street light, a shot rang out. He died.

V. NORTHERN NEW JERSEY

Reports of looting, sniping, fire and death in Newark were a web of tension over other Negro enclaves in northern New Jersey. Wherever Negro ghettos existed—Elizabeth, Englewood, Jersey City, Plainfield, New Brunswick—people had friends and relatives living in Newark. Everywhere the telephone provided a direct link to the scenes of violence. The telephoned messages frequently were at variance with reports transmitted by television, radio, and newspapers.

As reports of the extreme use of firearms in Newark grew, so did fear and anger in the Negro gratis. Concernedly, rumors amplified by radio, television and the newspapers—especially with regard to guerrilla bands reportedly roaming the streets—caused a wave of danger and terror within the white communities. To Mayor Patricia Whelan, questioned about Negro representation on the local government. In six New Jersey communities with sizable Negro populations, of a total of 50 councilmen, six were Negro. In a half dozen school systems in which Negroes comprised as much as half of the school population, of a total of 42 members on boards of education, seven were Negro.

In each of the ghettos the Negro felt himself surrounded by a constant wall of whites. In four suburban cities—Bloomingdale, Harrison, Irvington, and Maplewood—forming an arc around Newark, out of a total population of more than 125,000, only 1,000 were Negroes. In the six cities surrounding Plainfield, out of a population of more than 75,000, only 1,500 were Negroes.

Three northern New Jersey communities—Jersey City, Paterson, and Elizabeth—had had disorders in previous years, the first two in 1964 and 1965. In general, those seem to have developed from resentment against the police. The most serious outbreak had occurred in Jersey City after police had arrested a woman, and a rumor circulated that the woman had been beaten.

As early as May 1967, the authorities in Jersey City and Elizabeth had started receiving warnings of trouble.
from the immediate vicinity of the crowd. The officer in command agreed to pull back the patrols.

Workers from the anti-poverty agency and the Human Relations Commission began circulating through the area, attempting to get kids off the street. Many of the residents had relatives and friends in Newark. Based on what had happened there, they feared that, if the disturbance were not curbed, it would turn into a bloodbath.

The pacemakers were making little headway when a chicken flustered out of the shuttered window of a poultry market. One youth tried to throw gasoline on it and set it alight. As the gasoline sloshed onto the pave ment, the chicken leaped. The flames merely singed its feathers. A gangling 6-foot youth attempted to stomp the chicken. The bird, which had appeared dead, recovered and flurried and darted out of his way, the youth screamed, slipped, and tumbled against a tree.

The stark comedy reduced the tension. People laughed. Soon some began to drill batons. A short time later, a Molotov cocktail was thrown against the front of a tavern. Fire engines met with no opposition as they extinguished the flames before they could do much damage.

The chief of police ordered the area cleared. As the officers moved in, the people who remained on the street scattered. Within 15 minutes the neighborhood was deserted.

Both municipal authorities and Negro leaders feared that, if the disorder followed the pattern of other disturbances, there would be an intensification of action by youths the next day. Therefore, the next evening, police patrolled the 36 square blocks with more than 100 men, some of them stationed on rooftops. Tension continued to build.

As the peacekeepers began to make their influence felt, the police withdrew from the area. There was no further trouble.

Nevertheless, many white citizens reacted unfavorably to the fact that police had permitted Negro community leaders to aid in the dispersal of the crowd on the first night. The police were called "yellow," and accused of allowing the looting and damage.

In Englewood, a bedroom community of 28,000, astride the Palisades opposite New York, police had been expecting a riot by some of the city's 7,000 Negro residents since 2 weeks before Newark. As part of this expectation they had taken up a strong police firing range, situated in the middle of the Negro residential area. The wind had blown the tear gas into surrounding houses. The occupants had been enraged.

A continuing flow of rumors and anonymous tips to police of a riot in preparation had SPECIFIED to the mayor said, "I funerAl And hllllld to let them try, the ml)'or propl'()lod. The relldantl complained about to: Shoot force will be met with superior force." An officer's deviation from this order, the mayor said, would be considered dereliction of duty.

Some of the members of the delegation believed that the mayor had staged the reading of this order for their benefit, and were not pleased by his action. They had heard a "peace plan" take form. The mayor agreed to let them try. One hundred sticklers with the word "Pacemaker" were printed.

One of the leaders to be a pacemaker was Jermaine Jasser, a youth who officiated at Malcolm X's funeral. During two pilgrimages to Mecca, he is a leader of a small sect of Orthodox Moslems. A teacher of Arabic and the Koran at the Spirits House in Newark, he is a militant who impressed the mayor with his sense of responsibility.

Although Jasser believed that certain people were seeking the life blood out of the city, he refused to give up the number of taverns and bars in the Elizabeth port area and compare them with the number of recreation facilities—he had witnessed the carnage in Newark and believed it could serve no purpose to have a riot. Two dozen of his followers, in red fezzes, took to the streets to urge order. He himself traveled about in a car with a bullhorn.

As the pacemakers began to make their influence felt, the police withdrew from the area. There was no further trouble.

VI. PLAINFIELD

New Jersey's worst violence outside of Newark was experienced by Plainfield, a pleasant, tree-shaded city of 43,000. A "bedroom community," more than a third of whose residents work outside the city, Plainfield had had relatively few Negroes until 1950. By 1967, the Negro population had risen to an estimated 30 percent of the total. As in Englewood, there was a division between the Negro middle class, which lived in the East side ("plished ghetto," and the unskilled, unemployed and underemployed poor on the West side.

Geared to the needs of a suburban middle class, the part-time and fragmented city government had failed to realize the change in character which the city had undergone, and was unprepared to cope with the problems of a growing disadvantaged population. There was no full-time administrator or city manager. Board, with independent jurisdiction over such areas as edu cation, welfare and health, were appointed by the part-time mayor, whose own position was largely honorary.

Accustomed to viewing politics as a gentleman's pastime, city officials were startled and upset by the intensity with which demands issued from the ghetto. Usually such demands were not obstinately, rather than head-on.

In the summer of 1966, trouble was narrowly averted over the issue of a swimming pool for Negro youngsters. In the summer of 1967, instead of having built the pool, the city began busing the children to the county pool a half-hour's ride distant. The fare was 25 cents one way, and the children had to provide their own lunch, a considerable strain on a fragmental basis for a poor family with several children.

Plainfield, July 1967
Riot debris, Plainfield, July 1967

The but operated only on 5 days in midweek. On weekends the county pool was too crowded to accommodate children from the Plainfield ghetto.

Pressure increased upon the school system to adapt itself to the changing social and ethnic backgrounds of its pupils. There were strikers and boycotts. The track system created a de facto segregation within a supposedly integrated school system. Most of the young- sters from white middle-class districts were in the higher track, most from the Negro poverty areas in the lower. Relations were strained between same white students and Negro pupils. Two-thirds of school drop­ outs were estimated to be Negro.

In February 1967 the NAACP, out of a growing sense of frustration with the municipal government, took a list of 19 demands and complaints to the city hall. Most dealt with discrimination in housing, employment and in the public schools. By summer, the city's common council had not responded. Although two of the 11 council members were Negro, both represented the East side ghetto. The poverty area was represented by two white women, one of whom had been appointed by the council after the elected representative, a Negro, had moved away.

Relations between the police and the Negro community, tenous at best, had been further troubled the previous week when the elected representative, a Negro, had moved away.

When a delegation went to city hall to file a complaint, they were told by the city clerk that he was not empowered to accept it. Believing that they were being given the run-around, the delegation, angry and frustrated, departed.

On Friday evening, July 14, the same police officer was moonlighting as a private guard at a diner frequented by Negro youths. He was, reportedly, number two on the Negro community's "10 most wanted" list of unpopular police officers. (The list was colorblind. Although out of 82 officers on the force only five were Negro, two of the 10 on the "most wanted" list were Negro. The two officers most respected in the Negro community were white.)

Although most of the youths at the diner were of high school age, one, in his mid twenties, had a reputation as a bully. Sometime before 10 p.m., as a result of an argument, he hit a 16-year-old boy and split open his face. As the boy lay bleeding on the asphalt, his friends rushed to the police officer and demanded that he call an ambulance and arrest the offender. Instead, the officer walked over to the boy, looked at him, and reportedly said: "Why don't you just go home and wash up?" He refused to make an arrest.

The youths were incensed. They believed that, had the two participants in the incident been white, the older youth would have been arrested, the younger transported to the hospital immediately.

On the way to the housing project where most of these lived, the youths traversed four blocks of the city's business district. As they walked, they smashed three or four windows. An observer interpreted their behavior as a reaction to the incident at the diner, in effect challenging the police officer: "If you won't do anything about that, then let's see you do something about this!"

On one of the quiet city streets, two young Negroes, D. H. and L. C., had been neighbors. D. H. had graduated from high school, attended Fairleigh Dickinson University and, after receiving a degree in psychology, had obtained a job as a reporter on the Plainfield Courier-News. L. C. had dropped out of high school, become a dishwasher in a chemical plant, and, although still in his twenties, had married and fathered seven children. A man with a strong sense of family, he liked sports and played in the local baseball league. Active in civil rights, he had, like the civil rights organizations, over the years, become more militant. For a period of time he had been a Muslim.

The outbreak of vandalism aroused concern among the police. Shortly after midnight, in an attempt to decrease tensions, D. H. and the two Negro councilmen met with the youths in the housing project. The focal points of the youths' bitterness was the attitude of the police—until 1966 police had used the word "neg­ rist" over the police radio and one officer had worn a Confederate belt buckle and had flown a Confederate pennant on his car. Their complaints, however, ranged over local and national issues. There was an overwhelming conviction and disbelief that government would, of its own accord, make meaningful changes to improve the lot of the lower-class Negro. There was an overriding belief that there were two sets of policies by the people in power, whether law enforcement offi­ cers, newspaper editors, or government officials: one for white, and one for black.

There was little confidence this: the two councilmen could exercise any influence. One youth said: "You came down here last year. We were throwing stones at some passing cars, and you told us that this was not the way to do it. You got us to talk with the man. We talked to him. We talked with him, and we talked all year long. We ain't got nothing yet!"

However, on the promise that meetings would be arranged with the editor of the newspaper and with the mayor later that same day, the youths agreed to disperse.

At the first of these meetings, the youths were, apparently, satisfied by the explanation that the newspaper's coverage was not deliberately discriminatory. The meeting with the mayor, however, proceeded badly. Negroes present felt that the mayor was complacent and apathetic, and that they were simply being given the usual lip service, from which no good would develop.

The meeting, on the other hand, told Communist investigators that he recognized that "citizens are frustr­ ated by the political organization of the city," because he himself had no real power and "[o]ne of the councilmen says that he is just one of the 11 and therefore can't do anything."

After approximately 2 hours, a dozen of the youths walked out, indicating an impasse and signaling the breakup of the meeting. Shortly thereafter, window smashing began. A Molotov cocktail was set afire in a tree. One im­ portant engine, in which a white and Negro firefighter were sitting side by side, had a Molotov cocktail thrown at it. The white fireman was burned.

As window smashing continued, liquor stores and taverns were especially hard hit. Some of the young­ ers believed that there was an excess concentration of bars in the Negro section, and that these were an unhealthy influence in the community.

Because the police department had mobilized its full force, the situation, although serious, never appeared to get out of hand. Officers made many arrests. The chief of the fire department told Commission investi­ gators that it was his conclusion that "individuals mak­ ing fire bombs did not know what they were doing, or they could have burned the city."

At 3 o'clock Sunday morning, a heavy rain began, scattering whatever groups remained on the streets.
In the morning, police made no effort to cordone off the area. As white sightseers and churchgoers drove by the housing project, there was sporadic rock-throwing. By the middle of the afternoon, the violence had spread to the rest of the city. At 4 p.m., the police were called in to control the riot. The state police were deployed in riot gear, and National Guard troops prepared to enter the area. In order to direct the search as to likely locations, a list of arrestees was compiled. The state police were instructed to search for weapons and to protect the lives of the people. The riot was contained, and the city was able to return to normal.
VII. NEW BRUNSWICK

Although New Brunswick has about the same population as Plainfield, New Brunswick is a county seat and center of commerce, with an influx of people during the day. Its Negro ghetto, where there were rumors that "New Brunswick was really going to blow." Disaffection in the Negro community revolved around several issues: the closing of a local telephone company by the police department, the lack of a swimming pool and other recreation facilities, and the release of a white couple on very low bond after they had been arrested for allegedly shooting at three Negro teenagers. Elsewhere, there was a feeling that the law was not being applied equally to whites and Negroes.

By Monday, according to Mayor Patricia Sheehan, the town was "haunted by what had happened in Newark and Plainfield." James E. Aron, the associate director of the antipoverty program in Middlesex County, said there was a "tension in the air" that "got thicker and thicker."

Staff members of the antipoverty agency met with the mayor and city commissioners to discuss what steps might be taken to reduce the tension. The mayor, who had been on a reform platform 2 months previously, appointed a Negro police officer, Lieutenant John Brokaw, II, community liaison officer. He was authorized to report directly to the mayor.

Deprived of a swimming pool and other recreation facilities, police harassment, and poor housing, the Negro youth attacked discrimination, inferior educational opportunities, police harassment, and poor housing. The antipoverty agency set up a task force of workers to go into all of the communities, while Puerto Rican and Negro, to report information and to try to cool the situation.

The chief of police met with the chief of surrounding communities to discuss cooperation in case a disturbance broke out. The streets remained quiet until past 9 p.m. when loud reports of bottles being broken began to be received by police. At 10:10 p.m., Aron noticed 100 young men marching in a column of two down the street. A tall Negro minister stopped from the office of the antipoverty agency and placed himself in the street in order to hold it off. "Brothers! Stop! Let me talk to you!" he called out. The marchers brushed past him. A small boy, about 13 years old, looked up at the minister: "Black power, baby!" he said.

The New Brunswick police were reinforced by 100 officers from surrounding communities. Roadblocks were set up on all principal thoroughfares into the city. Wild rumors swept the city: reports of armed Negro and white gangs, shootouts, fires, beatings, and deaths. The mayor imposed a curfew, and recorded a tape, played periodically over the city's radio station, appealing for order. Most of the persons who had been picked up as alleged Negro teenagers, however, there was a feeling that the law was not being applied equally to whites and Negroes.

Mayor Sheehan went out to the demonstration and talked to the people. He went to the mayor.

At 10:50 p.m., Mayor Sheehan went out to the demonstration and talked to the people. He went to the front of the police station. The participants wanted to see the mayor.

Mayor Sheehan went out onto the steps of the station. Using a bullhorn, he talked to the people and asked that she be given an opportunity to correct conditions. The crowd was boisterous. Some persons challenged the mayor. But, finally, the opinion, "She's new! Give her a chance!" prevailed.

A demand was issued by people in the crowd that all persons arrested the previous night be released. Told that this already had been done, the people were suspicious. They asked to be allowed to inspect the jail cells.

It was agreed to permit representatives of the people to look in the cells to satisfy themselves that everyone had been released.

The crowd dispersed. The New Brunswick riot had failed to materialize.

VIII. DETROIT

On Saturday evening, July 22, the Detroit Police Department raised five "blind pigs." The blind pigs had had their origin in prohibition days, and survived as private social clubs. Often, they were after-hours drinking and gambling spots. The fifth blind pig, on the east side, the United Community and Civic League at the corner of 12th Street and Clairmount, had been raided twice before. Once 10 persons had been picked up; another time, 28. The Detroit vice squad officer had tried but failed to get in shortly after 10 o'clock Saturday night. He succeeded, on his second attempt, at 3:45 Sunday morning.

The Tactical Mobile Unit, the Police Department's crowd control squad, had been dismissed at 3 a.m. Since Sunday morning traditionally is the least troublesome time for police in Detroit—and all over the country—only 195 officers were patrolling the streets. Of these, 44 were in the 10th precinct where the blind pig was located.

Police expected to find two dozen patrons in the blind pig. That night, however, it was the scene of a party for several servicemen, two of whom were back from Vietnam. Instead of two dozen patrons, police found 82. Some voiced resentment at the police intrusion.

An hour went by before all 82 could be transported from the scene. The weather was hot and humid, and the temperature that day was 96—despite the last hour, many people were still on the street. In short order, a crowd of about 200 gathered.

In November of 1963, George Edwards, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and Commissioner of the Detroit Police Department from 1961 to 1963, had written in the Michigan Law Review:

Detroit riot, July 1967
At the time of Detroit's 1943 race riot, Judge Edward told Commission investigators, there was "open warfare between the Detroit Negroes and the Detroit Police Department." As late as 1961, he had thought that "there is a leading candidate in the United States for a race riot.

There was a long history of conflict between the police and citizens. The 1943 riot, in which 34 persons died, was the bloodiest in the United States in a span of two decades. Judge Edwards and his successor, Commissioner Ray Girardin, attempted to restructure the image of the department. A Citizens Complaint Bureau was set up to facilitate the filing of complaints by citizens against officers. In practice, however, this Bureau appeared to work little better than less enlightened and more cumbersome procedures in other cities.

By midmorning, 1,122 men—approximately a fourth of the police department—had reported for duty. Of these, 540 were in or near the six-block riot area. One hundred eight officers were 특정하기 때문에, 그들은 자분한 경찰을 찾았습니다. 그러나, 경찰은 무근한 상황을 유지하기 위해, 다음과 같은 조치를 취했습니다.

1) The police failed to interfere with people who attempted to start fires.
2) The police did not respond to requests for assistance.
3) The police did not move out of the neighborhood.
4) The police did not feel that the streets were safe.
5) The police did not believe that the residents were home owners.
6) The police did not anticipate violence.

At about the same time, the killing of Danny Thomas, a 27-year-old Negro Army veteran, by a gang of white youths had inflamed the community. The 1943 riot, in which 34 persons died, was the bloodiest in the United States in a span of two decades. Judge Edwards and his successor, Commissioner Ray Girardin, attempted to restructure the image of the department. A Citizens Complaint Bureau was set up to facilitate the filing of complaints by citizens against officers. In practice, however, this Bureau appeared to work little better than less enlightened and more cumbersome procedures in other cities.

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them and called their actions senseless. An epidemic of excitement had swept over the persons on the street. Congressman Conyers interviewed a woman with a baby in her arms; she was raging, cursing "whitey" for no apparent reason.

Before the fire, Conyers asked some Negro police to patrol various areas. A spirit of carefree nihilism was taking hold. To riot was a sport, not a means to an end.

In a decade, the school system had gained 50,000 to 60,000 children. Fifty-one percent of the elementary school classes were overcrowded. Simple to achieve the statewide average, the system needed 1,650 more teachers and 3,100 additional classrooms. The combined cost would be $65 million. Of 200,000 school children, 171,000, or 57 percent, were Negro. According to the Detroit superintendent of schools, 23 different school districts surrounding the city spent up to $500 more per pupil per year than Detroit. In the inner city schools, more than half the pupils who entered high school became dropouts.

The strong union structure had created excellent conditions for most working men, but had left others, such as civil service and Government workers, comparatively disadvantaged and dissatisfied. In June, the "Blue Flu" had struck the city as police officers, forbidden to strike, had staged a sick-out. In September, the teachers refused to go on strike. The starting wages for a plumber's helper were almost equal to the salary of a police officer or teacher.

A request was made for state police aid. By 3 p.m., some of the programs were still closed. High school diplomas from inner-city schools were worth almost nothing in comparison to Newark, where approximately 1,000 firemen patrol an area of 16 square miles with a population of 1.6 million. Because the department had no mutual aid agreement and it could not produce on promises to correct such conditions as poor garbage collection and had street lighting, which brought constant complaints from Negroes.

On 12th Street, Carl Perry, the Negro proprietor of a drugstore and photography studio, was screaming ice cream, soda, and candy to the youngsters streaming in and out of his store. For questioning, he had brought the photography equipment from his studio, in the next block, to the drugstore. The youths milling about repeatedly assured him that, although the market next door had been ransacked, his place of business was in no danger.

In mid-afternoon, the market was set afire. Soon after, the drug store went up in flames.

State Representative James Del Rio, a Negro, was campaigning in front of a building when two small boys, neither more than 10 years old, approached. One prepared to throw a brick through a window. Del Rio stopped him: "This building belongs to me and yours to another.

"I'm glad you told me, baby, because I was just about to hurt you in it," the youngster replied.

Some evidence that criminal elements were organizing spontaneously to take advantage of the riots began to manifest itself. A number of cars were noted to be returning again and again, their occupants metodically looting stores. Months later, goods stolen during the riot were still being peddled.

A Negro plainclothes officer was standing at an intersection when a man threw a Molotov cocktail into a business establishment at the corner. In the heat of the afternoon, fanned by the 20 to 25 m.p.h. winds of both Sunday and Monday, the fire reached the homes next door within minutes. As residents usually sprayed the flames with garden hoses, the fire jumped from roof to roof of adjacent two- and three-story buildings. Within the hour, the entire block was in flames. The ninth house in the burning four-square block belonged to the arsonist who had thrown the Molotov cocktail.

In some areas, residents organized rifle squads to protect firefighters. Elsewhere, even those who focused on the winds-whipped flames began to overwhelm the Detroit Fire Department and more and more residents burned, the firesmen were subjected to curses and rock-throwing.

Because of a lack of funds, on a per capita basis the downtown district was one of the most blighted in the nation. In comparison to Newark, where approximately 1,000 firemen patrol an area of 16 square miles with a population of 400,000, Detroit's 1,700 firemen must cover a city of 140 square miles with a population of 1.6 million. Because the department had no mutual aid agreement with surrounding communities, it could not
quickly call in reinforcements from outlying areas, and it was almost 9 p.m. before the first arrived. At one point, out of a total of 92 pieces of Detroit firefighting equipment that had brought in from surrounding communities, only four engine companies were available to guard areas of the city outside the riot perimeter.

As the afternoon progressed, the fire department's radio carried repeated messages of apprehension and orders of caution:

There is no police protection here at all; there isn't a police officer in the area. ** * * * If you hear trouble at all, pull out! ** * * * We're being aimed at the scene. It's going good. We need help! ** * * * Protect yourselves! Proceed away from the scene. ** * * * Engine 42 over at Livernois and Griswold. They're throwing bottles at us. We aren't going to stand for it. ** * * * All companies without police protection—all companies without police protection orders are to withdraw, do not try to put out the fire! You just had to bow down to the white man. ** * * * When the insurance man would come by he would always call out to my mother by her first name, and warn her to protect herself. I didn't know him. ** * * * Man, I know he would never have thought of me or my father going to his house and calling his wife by her first name. Then I once saw a white man shoveling a young pregnant Negro woman on the street with fists that she just spun around and fell. I'll never forget that.

When a friend called to tell him about the riot on 12th Street, E.G. went there expecting "a true revolt," but was disappointed as soon as he saw the looters and the damage they had done, and in fear, if any, of the fire was the scene originally.

Governor George Romney flew over the area between 8:50 and 9 p.m. "It looked like the city had been looted on the west side and there was an area, two-and-a-half miles by three-and-a-half miles with major fires, with entire blocks in flames," he told the Commission.

In the midst of chaos, there were some unexpected individual responses. Twenty-four-year-old E.G., a Negro born in Sarnia, Ga., had come to Detroit in 1965 to attend Wayne State University. Rebellion had been building in him for a long time because:

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morton, commander of Task Force Detroit, met Cyrus Vance and General Throckmorton independently came which lasted until 7:15 p.m. During this tour Mr. Vance and General Throckmorton independently came to the conclusion that—since they had seen no looting or sniping, since the fires appeared to be coming under control, and since a substantial number of National Guardmen had not yet been committed—incursion of Federal troops would be premature.

As the riot alternately waned and waxed, one area of the ghetto remained insulated. On the northeast side of the city, a whole block of buildings inhabited by 21,000 persons, had in 1966, banded together in the Positive Neighborhood Action Committee (PNAC). With the help of the Institute of Urban Dynamics, they had organized block clubs and made plans for the improvement of the neighborhood. In order to help defuse the situation, two National Guard units, which the city was not providing, they had raised $3,000 to.

The reporter interviewed the men who had gotten off the bus and were crouched around it. When he asked the soldiers about the sniping incident, he was told that someone had heard a shot. He asked “Did the bullet hit the bus?” The answer was: “We don’t know.”

By 10 o’clock, the area was reported to the southeastern sector, which was to be taken over by the paratroopers. The first day of hostilities began.

At approximately the same time, firemen, police, and civilians had arrived. As the argument continued, the men were told they would have to detour around the school and a fire station at Mack and St. Jean Streets. For the firing that had been occurring. Following orders, they took a circuited route and approached the police’s house from the southeast. On Lyceum Street, between Charlevoix and Geothermal, a Negro crowd threatened the police. Believing it to be another roadblock, they slowed down, stopped, and asked for directions.

Other National Guardmen at the scene thought the shot had come from the station wagon. Shot after shot was directed against a house; at least 17 of them were hit. At 10 o’clock, the men were shot at and killed. John Leroy was fatally injured.

At approximately the same time, firemen, police, and civilians at the corner of Mack and St. Jean Streets, 215 blocks away, again came under fire from what they believed were rooftop snipers to the southwest, the direction of Charlevoix and Lyceum. The police and guardsmen responded with a hail of tear gas. When the shooting ceased, Carl Smith, a young fire-fighter, lay dead. An autopsy determined that the shot had been fired at street level, according to police, probably had come from the southeast. At 4 a.m., when paratroopers, under the command
of Col. A. R. Bolling, arrived at the high school, the area was as dark and still that the colonel thought, at first, that he had come to the wrong place. Investigating, he discovered National Guard troops, claiming they were pounced down by sniper fire, crouched behind the walls of the darkened building.

The colonel immediately ordered all of the lights in the building turned on and his troops to show themselves as conspicuously as possible. In the apartment houses across the street, nearly every window had been shot out, and the walls were plastered with bullet holes. The colonel went into the building and began talking to the residents, many of whom had spent the night huddled on the floor. He assured them no more shots would be fired.

According to Lieutenant General Thomkirk and Colonel Bolling, the city, at this time, was saturated with fear. The National Guardsmen were garbage, and trace persons who had disappeared in the area occupied by them was the quietest in the city.

In order to accomplish this, every effort was made to establish contact and rapport between the troops and the residents. Troopers—20 percent of whom were Negroes—began helping to clean up the streets, collect garbage, and trace persons who had disappeared in the confusion. Residents in the neighborhoods reported with snipers and machineguns for the first few hours, after which stricter discipline was enforced. (In contrast, New Jersey National Guardsmen and state police expended 15,528 rounds of ammunition in three days in Newark.) Hundreds of reports of sniper fire—most of them false—continued to pour into police headquarters, the Army logged only 10. No paratrooper was injured by a gunshot. Only one person was hit by a shot fired by a trooper. He was a young Negro who was killed when he ran into the line of fire as a trooper, adding police in a car on an apartment, aimed at a person believed to be sniper.

General Thomkirk ordered the weapons of all military personnel unloaded, but either the order failed to reach many National Guardsmen, or else it was not obeyed.

As in the general was requesting the city to re-light the streets, Guardsmen continued shooting out the lights, and there were reports of dooms of shots being fired to dispatch one light. At such one location, as Guardsmen were shooting out the street lights, a radio newscaster reported himself to be pinned down by "sniper fire."

On the same day that the general was attempting to restore normalcy by ordering street barricades taken down, Guardsmen on one street were not only, in broad daylight, ordering people off the street, but off their porches and away from the windows. Two persons who failed to respond to the order quickly enough were shot, one of them fatally.

The general himself reported an incident of a Guardsman "firing across the bow" of an automobile that was approaching a roadblock.

As in Los Angeles 2 years earlier, roadblocks that were ill-lighted and ill-defined—often consisting of no more than a trash barrel or similar object with Guardsmen standing nearby—proved a continuous hazard to motorists. At one such roadblock, National Guard Sgt. Larry Post, standing in the street, was caught in a sudden crossfire as his fellow Guardsmen opened up on a vehicle. He was the only soldier killed in the riot.

With persons of every description arming themselves, and guns being fired accidentally or on the vaguest pretext all over the city, it became more and more impossible to tell who was shooting at whom. Some firearm began carrying guns. One accidentally shot and wounded a fellow firearm. Another injured himself.

The chaos of a riot, and the difficulties faced by police officers, are demonstrated by an incident that occurred at 2 a.m., Tuesday.

A unit of 12 officers received a call to guard firemen from snipers. When they arrived at the corner of Vicksburg and Linwood in the 12th Street area, the intersection was well-lighted by the flames completely enveloping one building. Sniper fire was directed at the officers from an alley to the north, and gun flashes were observed in two buildings.

As the officers advanced on the buildings, Patrolman Johnnie Hamilton fired several rounds from his machinegun. Therewith, the officers were suddenly subjected to fire from a new direction, the east. Hamilton, struck by four bullets, fell, critically injured, in the intersection. At two officers ran to his aid, they too were hit.

By this time other units of the Detroit Police Department, state police, and National Guard had arrived on the scene, and the area was covered with a hall of gunfire.

In the confusion the snipers who had initiated the shooting escaped.

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ings. These were still pending when the riot broke out.

Concerned about the house, R. R. decided to fly to Detroit. He arrived at the house on Wednesday, July 26, he discovered the tenants were not at home. He then called his attorney, who advised him to take physical possession of the house and, for legal purposes, to take witnesses along.

Together with his 17-year-old brother and another white youth, R. R. went to the house, entered, and began changing the locks on the doors. For protection they brought a .22 caliber rifle, which R. R.'s brother took into the cell and fired into a pillow in order to test it.

Shortly after 8 p.m., R. R. called his attorney to advise him that the tenants had returned, and he had refused to leave. The tenants, who had been picked up, R. R. alleged, the tenants had threatened to obtain the help of the National Guard, who had called later that he was not particularly concerned. He told R. R. that if the National Guard did appear he should have the officer in charge call him (the attorney).

At approximately the same time, the National Guard claims it received information that the several men had evicted the legal occupants of the house, and intended to start sniping after dark.

A National Guard COLUMN was dispatched to the scene. Shortly after 9 p.m., in the half-light of dusk, the column of approximately 30 men surrounded the house. A tank took position on a lawn across the street. Together with his 17-year-old brother and another white youth, R. R. went to the house, entered, and began changing the locks on the doors. For protection they brought a .22 caliber rifle, which R. R.'s brother took into the cell and fired into a pillow in order to test it.

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Before the arrest of a young woman IBM operator in the city assessor's office brought attention to the situation on Friday, July 28, any person with a gun in his home was liable to be picked up as a suspect.

Of the 27 persons charged with sniping, 22 had charges against them dismissed at preliminary hearings, and the charges against two others were dismissed later. One pleaded guilty to possession of an unregistered gun and was given a suspended sentence. Trials of two are pending.

In all, more than 7,200 persons were arrested. Almost 3,000 of these were picked up on the second day of the riot, and by midnight Monday 4,000 were incarcerated in makeshift jails. Some were kept as long as 30 hours on buses. Others spent days in an underground garage without toilet facilities. An uncounted number were people who had merely been unfortunate to show their credentials had been ignored. Released later, they were chided for not having exhibited their identification at the time of their arrests.

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The booking system proved incapable of adequately handling the large number of arrestees. People became lost for days in the maze of different detention facilities. Until the later stages, bail was set deliberately high, often at $10,000 or more. When it became apparent that this policy was unrealistic and unworkable, the prosecutor's office began releasing on low bail or on their own recognizance hundreds of those who had been picked up. Nevertheless, this fact was not publicized for fear of antagonizing those who had demanded a high-bail policy.

Of the 43 persons who were killed during the riot, 33 were Negro and 10 were white. Seventeen were looters, of whom two were white. Fifteen citizens (of whom four were white), one white National Guardsman, one white fireman, and one Negro private guard died as the result of gunshot wounds. Most of these deaths appear to have been accidental, but criminal homicide is suspected in some.

Two persons, including one fireman, died as a result of fallen powerlines. Two were burned to death. One was a drunken guerrier; one an armed suspect.

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The approximately 1,200 persons interviewed represented a cross section of officials, observers, and participants involved in the riot process—from mayors, police chiefs, and army officers to Black Power advocates and rioters. Experts in diverse fields, such as taxation, fire fighting, and psychology, were consulted. Testimony presented to the Commission in closed hearings was incorporated.

Many official documents were used in compiling chronologies and corroborating statements made by witnesses. These included but were not limited to police department and other law enforcement agencies' after-action reports, logs, incident reports, injury reports, and reports of homicide investigations; after-action reports of U.S. Army and National Guard units; FBI reports; fire department logs and reports; and reports from prosecutors' offices and other investigating agencies.

About 1,300 pages of depositions were taken from 90 witnesses to substantiate each of the principal items in the Profiles. Since some information was supplied to the Commission on a confidential basis, a fully annotated, footnoted copy of the Profiles cannot be made public at this time, but will be deposited in the Archives of the United States.
Chapter 2
Patterns of Disorder

INTRODUCTION

The President asked the Commission to answer several specific questions about the nature of riots:
• The kinds of communities in which they occurred;
• The characteristics—including age, education, and job history—of those who rioted and those who did not;
• The ways in which groups of lawful citizens can be encouraged to help cool the situation;
• The relative impact of various depressed conditions in the ghetto which stimulated people to riot;
• The impact of Federal and other programs on those conditions;
• The effect on rioting of police-community relationships;
• The parts of the community which suffered the most as a result of the disorders.

The Profiles in the foregoing chapter portray the nature and extent of 10 of the disorders which took place during the summer of 1967. This chapter seeks in these events, and in the others which we surveyed, a set of common elements to aid in understanding what happened and in answering the President's questions.

This chapter also considers certain popular conceptions about riots. Disorders are often discussed as if there were a single type. The "typical" riot of recent years is sometimes seen as a random explosion against white people, involving widespread burning, looting, and raping; either by all ghetto Negroes or by an uneducated, Southern-born Negro underclass of habitual criminals or "villains". An agitator at a protest demonstration, the coverage of events by the news media, or an isolated "triggering" or "precipitating" incident, is often identified as the primary spark of violence. A uniform set of stages is sometimes posited, with a succession of confrontations and withdrawals by two cohesive groups, the police on one side and a riotous mob on the other. Often it is assumed that there was little effort within the Negro community to reduce the violence. Sometimes the only remedy prescribed is application of the largest possible police or control force, as early as possible.

What we have found does not validate these conceptions. We have been unable to identify constant patterns in all aspects of civil disorders. We have found that they are unusual, irregular, complex, and, in the present state of knowledge, unpredictable social processes. Like many human events, they do not unfold in orderly sequences.

Moreover, we have examined the 1967 disorders within a few months after their occurrence and under pressing time limitations. While we have collected information of considerable immediacy, analysis will undoubtedly improve with the passage and perspective of time and with the further accumulation and refinement of data. To facilitate further analyses we have appended much of our data to this report.

We have categorized the information now available about the 1967 disorders as follows:
• The pattern of violence over the nation: severity, location, timing, and numbers of people involved;
The riot process in a sample of 24 disorders we have studied typically varied greatly in terms of violence and damage: while a relatively small number were minor under ordinary or extraordinary conditions, most of the disorders would have received little or no national attention as "riots" had the Negro not been sensitized by the more serious outbreaks.

5. There was, typically, a complex relationship between the series of incidents and the underlying grievances. For example, grievances about allegedly abusive police practices, enforcement of employment and unemployment, housing, and other conditions in the ghettos, were often aggravated in the minds of many Negroes by the perceived frustration of the ghetto community, which in turn increased the likelihood and severity of disorders.

6. Many grievances in the Negro community result from the discrimination, prejudice and powerlessness which Negroes often experience. They also result from the severely disadvantaged social and economic conditions of many Negroes as compared with those of whites in the same city and, more particularly, in the predominantly white suburbs.

7. Characteristically, the typical rioter was not a hoodlum, habitual criminal or ruffian; nor was he a recent immigrant, a member of an uneducated under-class or a person lacking broad social and political concern. Instead, he was a teenager or young adult, a lifelong resident of the city in which he resided, a high school dropout—but somewhat better educated than the Negro neighborhood—and almost invariably under-privileged, if not impoverished.

8. Numerous Negro counter-rioters walked the streets urging rioters to "cool it." The typical counter-rioter revealed in many respects the majority of Negroes, who neither rioted nor took action against the rioters, that is, the noninvolved. But certain differences were noted; the counter-rioters were more difficult to control, and their actions were not as serious as those of the rioters. While the rioters were often involved in direct violence, the counter-rioters were typically charged with looting and contributing to the breaking point; and the tension spilled over into violence.

9. There were, typically, a complex relationship between the series of incidents and the underlying grievances. For example, grievances about allegedly abusive police practices, enforcement of employment and unemployment, housing, and other conditions in the ghettos, were often aggravated in the minds of many Negroes by the perceived frustration of the ghetto community, which in turn increased the likelihood and severity of disorders.

10. The chain we have identified—discrimination, prejudice, dispossessed conditions, intense and pervasive grievances, a series of tension-heightening incidents, all culminating in the eruption of disorder at the hands of youthful, politically-aware activists—must be understood as describing the central trend in the disorders, not as an explanation of all aspects of the riots or of all rioters. Some rioters, for example, may have shared neither the conditions nor the grievances of their Negro neighbors; some may have cooly and deliberately exploited the chaos created by others; some may have been drawn into the melee merely because they identified with, or wished to emulate, others. Nor do we intend to suggest that the majority of the rioters, who shared the adverse conditions and grievances, necessarily articulated in their own minds the connection between that background and their actions.

I. THE PATTERN OF VIOLENCE AND DAMAGE

LEVELS OF VIOLENCE AND DAMAGE

Because definitions of civil disorder vary widely, between 51 and 217 disorders were recorded by various agencies as having occurred during the five months of 1967. From these sources we have developed a list of 184 disorders which occurred during that period. We have ranked them in three categories of violence and damage, utilizing such criteria as the degree and duration of violence, the number of active participants, and the level of law enforcement response.

Major Disorders

Eight disorders, 5 percent of the total, were major. These were characterized generally by a combination of the following factors: (1) many fires, intensive looting, and reports of sniping; (2) violence lasting more than 2 days; (3) sizable crowds; and (4) use of National Guard or Federal forces as well as other control forces.

Serious Disorders

Thirty-three disorders, 20 percent of the total were serious but not major. These were characterized generally by: (1) isolated looting, some fires, and some rock throwing; (2) violence lasting between 1 and 2 days; (3) only one streetable crowd or many small groups; and (4) use of local police, although generally not National Guard or Federal forces.

Minor Disorders

One hundred and twenty-three disorders, 75 percent of the total, were minor. These would not have been classified as "riots" or received wide press attention. These were characterized by some local crowd control and some minor damage. Three of these were categorized generally by: (1) a few fires or broken windows; (2) violence lasting generally less than 1 day; (3) participation by only small numbers of people; and (4) use, in most cases, only of local police or police from a neighboring community.

The 164 disorders which we have categorized occurred in 128 cities. Twenty-five (20 percent) of the cities had two or more disturbances. New York had five separate disorders, Chicago had four, six cities had three, and 17 cities had two. Two cities experienced a major disorder—Cincinnati and Tampa—had subsequent disorders; Cincinnati had two; and one city had a later disorder which was less serious than the earlier ones. In only two cities were later disorders more severe.
Three conclusions emerge from the data:

- The size of disturbances occurring in communities with populations of 250,000 or more, but 37 (23 percent) of the disorders reviewed occurred in communities with populations of 25,000 or less. 67 disorders (41 percent) occurred in communities with populations of 100,000 or less, including nine (about 22 percent) of the 41 serious or major disturbances.

- The level of disorder, however, has been exaggerated. Three-fifths of the disorders were relatively minor and would not have been regarded as nationally-renewed "riots" in prior years.

- The fact that a city with vaccinated disorder earlier in 1967 did not experience it is unfounded.

**DISTRIBUTION IN TERMS OF TIME, AREA, AND SIZE OF COMMUNITY**

**Time**

In 1967, disorders occurred with increasing frequency as summer approached and tapered off as it waned. More than 60 percent of the 166 disorders occurred in July and August.

**Area**

The violence was not limited to any one section of the country.

**Size of Community**

The violence was not limited to large cities. Seven of the eight major disturbances occurred in communities with populations of 250,000 or more. But 37 (23 percent) of the disorders reviewed occurred in communities with populations of 25,000 or less. 67 disorders (41 percent) occurred in communities with populations of 100,000 or less, including nine (about 22 percent) of the 41 serious or major disturbances.

**DISTRIBUTION BY LEVEL AND CITY POPULATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City Population (In Thousands)</th>
<th>Number of Disorders</th>
<th>Number of Disasters</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>0-50</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>50-100</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-250</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250-500</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-1,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000-2,500</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500-5,000</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-10,000</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-25,000</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>114</td>
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<td>25,000+</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>166</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When timing and location are considered together, other relationships appear. Ninety-eight disorders can be grouped into 23 clusters, which consist of two or more disturbances occurring within 2 weeks and within a few hundred miles of each other.

"Clustering" was particularly striking for two sets of disorders in certain critical respects. These events exploded in ways related to the local community and conflicts. But once violence erupted, there began a complex interaction of many elements—rioters, official forces, counter-rioters—in which the differences between various disorders were more pronounced than the similarities.

**II. THE RIOT PROCESS**

The Commission has found no "typical" disorder in 1967 in terms of intensity of violence and seriousness of damage. To determine whether, as is sometimes suggested, there was a typical "riot process," we examined 24 disorders which occurred during 1967 in 20 cities and three university settings. We have concentrated on four aspects of that process:

- The accumulating reserve of grievances in the Negro community;
- Precipitating incidents and their relationship to the reservoir of grievances;
- The development of violence after its initial outbreak;
- Other human costs—fear, distrust, and alienation—were incurred in every disorder. Third, even a relatively low level of violence and damage in absolute terms may seriously disrupt a small or medium-sized community.

**VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE**

Of the 55 persons who died in the 75 disorders studied by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 98 percent were public officials, primarily law officers and firefighters. Among the injured, public officials made up 38 percent. The overwhelming majority of the civilians killed and injured were Negro.

Retail businesses suffered a much larger proportion of the damage during the disorders than public institutions, industrial properties, or private residences. In Newark, 1,029 establishments, affecting some 4,492 employees and employers, suffered damage to buildings or loss of inventory or cash. Those which suffered the greatest loss through looting, in descending order of loss were, jewelry, clothing, and furniture stores. White-owned businesses are widely believed to have been damaged much more frequently than those owned by Negroes. In at least nine of the cities studied, the damage seems to have been, at least in part, the result of deliberate attacks on white-owned businesses characterized in the Negro community as unfair or disrespectful toward Negroes.

Not all the listed damage was purposeful or was caused by rioters. Some was a byproduct of violence. In certain instances police and fire department control efforts caused damage. The New Jersey Commission on Civil Disorders has found that in Newark, over $200 million was taken against Negro-owned property by control forces. Some damage was accidental. In Detroit some fire damage, especially to residences, may have been caused primarily by a heavy wind.

Public institutions generally were not targets of seri-
THE RESERVOIR OF GRIEVANCES IN THE NEGRO COMMUNITY

Our examination of the background of the surveyed disorders revealed a typical pattern of deeply held grievances which were widely shared by many members of the Negro community.24 The specific content of the expressed grievances varied somewhat from city to city. But in general, grievances among Negroes in all the cities related to prejudice, discrimination, severely disadvantaged living conditions, and a general sense of frustration about their inability to change these conditions.

Specific events or incidents exemplified and reinforced the shared sense of grievance. News of such incidents spread quickly throughout the community and added to the reservoir. Grievances about police practices, unemployment and underemployment, housing, and other objective conditions in the ghetto were aggravated in the minds of many Negroes by the inaction of municipal authorities.

Out of this reservoir of grievance and frustration, the riot process began in the cities which we surveyed.

PRECIPITATING INCIDENTS

In virtually every case a single "triggering" or "precipitating" incident can be identified as having immediately preceded—within a few hours and in generally the same location—the outbreak of disorder.25 But this incident was usually a relatively minor, even trivial one, by itself substantially disproportionate to the scale of violence that followed. Often it was an incident of a type which had occurred frequently in the same community in the past without provoking violence.

We found that violence was generated by an increasingly disturbed social atmosphere, in which typically not one, but a series of incidents occurred over a period of weeks or months prior to the outbreak of disorder. For example, incidents have not always increased tension; and tension has not always resulted in violence. We conclude only that both processes did occur in the disorders we examined. Similarly, we do not suggest that all rioters shared the conditions or the grievances of their Negro neighbors: some many deliberately have exploited the chasm created out of the frustration of others; some may have been drawn into the melee merely because they identified with, or wished to emulate, others. Some who shared the adverse conditions and grievances did not riot.

We found that the majority of the rioters did share the adverse conditions and grievances, although they did not necessarily articulate in their own minds the connection between that background and their actions.

Newark and Detroit presented typical examples of the effect of prior incidents, a buildup of tensions, a final incident, and the outbreak of violence.

NEWARK

Prior Incidents

1965: A Newark policeman shot and killed an 18-year-old Negro boy. After the policeman had stated that he had fallen and his gun had discharged accidently, he later claimed that this youth had assaulted another officer and was shot as he fled. As a hearing was decided that the patrolman had not used excessive force. The patrolman remained on duty, and his occasional assignment to Negro areas was a continuing source of irritation in the Negro community.

April 1967: Approximately 15 Negroes were arrested while picketing a grocery store which they claimed sold bad meat and used unfair credit practices.

Late May, early June: Negro leaders had for several months voiced strong opposition to a proposed medical-dental center to be built on 135 acres of land in the predominantly Negro central ward. The dispute centered around the lack of relocation provision for those who would be displaced by the medical center. The issue became extremely volatile within days May when public hearings were held regarding the land to be condemned. The hearing became a public forum in which many whites spoke against the proposed center. The city did not change its plan.

Late May, June: The mayor recommended appointment of a white city consultant who had not more than a high school education to the position of secretary to the board of education. Reportedly, there was widespread support from both whites and Negroes for a Negro candidate who held a master's degree and was considered more qualified. The mayor did not change his recommendation. Ultimately, the original successor retired, and a Negro candidate was appointed.

July 1: Several Newark policemen, allegedly including the patrolmen involved in the 1965 killing, entered East Orange to arrest the East Orange police during an altercation with a group of Negro men.

Final Incident

July 12, approximately 5:00 p.m.: A Negro cab driver was injured during or after a traffic jam in the heart of the central ward. Word spread quickly, and a crowd gathered in front of the Fourth Precinct police station across the street from a large public housing project.

DETROIT

Initial Violence

Same day, approximately 1:10 p.m.: This crowd continued to grow until it reached 300 to 500 people. One or two Molotov cocktails were thrown at the stationhouse. Shortly after midnight this police dispersed the crowd, and windowbreaking and looting began a few minutes later. By about 1 a.m., the peak level of violence for the first night was reached.

Prior Incidents

August 1966: A crowd formed during a routine arrest of several Negro youths in the Northeastern section of the city. Tensions were high for several hours, but no serious violence resulted.

June 1967: A Negro prostitute was shot to death in her front steps. Rumors in the Negro community attributed the killing to a vice-squad officer. A police investigation reportedly resulted in a dismissed pty.

No streets were cleared.

June 25: A young Negro man on a picnic was shot to death while reportedly trying to protect his pregnant wife from assault by seven white youths. The wife survived the slaying and miscarried shortly thereafter. Of the white youths, only one was charged. The others were released.

Final Incident

July 23, approximately 2:45 a.m.: Police raided a "blind pig," a type of night club in the Negro area which served alcohol after hours. Eight persons were in the club—more than the police had anticipated—attending a party for several servicemen, two of whom had recently returned from Vietnam. A crowd of about 200 persons gathered as the police escorted the patrons into the police wagons.

Initial Violence

Approximately 5:00 a.m.: As the last police car drove away from the "blind pig," the crowd began to throw rocks. By 8:00 a.m., looting had become widespread. Violence continued to increase throughout the day, and by evening reached a peak level for the first day.

In the 24 disorders surveyed, the events identified as tension-heightening incidents, whether prior or final, involved issues which generally paralleled the grievances we found in these cities.26 The incidents involved were of the following types:

Police Actions

Some 40 percent of the prior incidents involved allegedly abusive or discriminatory police actions.27 Most of the police incidents began routinely and involved a response to, at most, a few persons rather than a large group.

A typical incident occurred in Bridgeport, N.J., 5 days before the disturbance when two police officers went to the home of a young Negro man to investigate a nonsupport complaint. A fight ensued when the officers attempted to take the man to the police station, and the Negro was critically injured and partially paralyzed. A crowd of about 500 persons gathered as the police escorted the police wagons.

Service station burns amidst guttered buildings, Detroit, July 1967
paralyzed. A Negro minister representing the injured man's family asked for suspension of the two officers involved pending investigation. This procedure had been followed previously when three policemen were accused of the robbery of a white-owned store. The Negro's request was not granted.

Police actions were also identified as the final incident preceding 12 of the 24 disturbances. Again, in all but two cases, the police action which became the final incident began routinely.

The final incident in Grand Rapids occurred when police attempted to apprehend a Negro driving an allegedly stolen car. A crowd of 20 to 40 Negro spectators gathered. The suspect had one arm in a car, and some of the younger Negroes in the crowd intervened because they thought the police were handling him too roughly.

Protest Activities

Approximately 22 percent of the prior incidents involved Negro demonstration, rallies, and protest meetings. Only five involved appearances by nationally known Negro militants.45

Protest rallies and meetings were also identified as the final incident preceding five disturbances. Nationally known Negro militants spoke at two of these meetings; in the other three only local leaders were involved.46 A prior incident involving alleged police brutality was the principal subject of each of three rallies.47 Inclusion of municipal authorities was the topic of two other meetings.48

White Racistr Activities

About 17 percent of the prior incidents involved activities by whites intended to discredit or intimidate Negroes. These included some 15 cross-burnings in Bridgeport, the harassment of Negro college students by white teenagers in Jackson, Mississippi, and, in Detroit, the slaying of a Negro by a group of white youths.49 No final incidents were identified as prior incidents in four cases.50 However, these activities were considered as precedents of the subsequent disturbances.

Previous Disorders in the Same City

In this category were approximately 16 percent of the prior incidents, including seven previous disorders, the handling of which had produced a continuing sense of grievance.51 There were other incidents, usually of minor violence, which occurred prior to seven disorders52 and were seen by the Negro community as precursors of the subsequent disturbances. Typically, in Philadelphia the night before the July disorder, a Negro youth was injured in an altercation between white and Negro teenagers. Traditions were set as a result.53 No final incidents were identified in this category.

Disorders in Other Cities

Local riot coverage and rumors generated by the Newark and Detroit riots were specifically identified in approximately 14 percent of the prior incidents.54

Typical was a case in Houston a month-and-a-half before the disorder. Three civil rights advocates were arrested for leading a protest and for their participation in an explosion of gangs at the predominantly Negro Texas Southern University. Bond was set at $25,000 each. The court refused for several days to reduce bond, even though 731 officials dropped the charges they had originally preferred.

There were no final incidents identified involving the administration of justice.

In a unique case, New Haven, the shooting of a Puerto Rican by a white man was identified as the final incident before violence.

Finally, we have noted a marked relationship between prior and final incidents within each city. In most of the cities surveyed, the final incident was of the same type as one or more prior incidents preceding seven disturbances.55

Rallies or meetings to protest police actions involved in a prior incident were identified as the final incident preceding three additional disturbances.56

The cumulative reinforcement of grievances and heightening of tensions found in all instances were particularly evident in these cases.

The Development of Violence

Once the series of precipitating incidents culminated in violence, the riot process did not follow a uniform pattern in the 24 disturbances surveyed. Generally, some similarities emerge.

The final incident before the outbreak of disorder, and the initial violence itself, generally occurred at a time when the streets were the most normal of the day, that is, one hour before or on the street at the time and place of the first outbreak.60

In all 24 disturbances, including the three unsuccessful disorders, the initial disturbance area consisted of streets with relatively high concentrations of pedestrian and automobile traffic.61 In all but two cases—Detroit and Milwaukee—violence appeared to occur as frequently during one cycle of violence as during another in which continuity through more than one cycle.62 Hollingsworth stressed that the process did not follow a uniform pattern in the 24 disorders purveyed.63 However, some variations emerged.

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The Control Effort

What type of community response is most effective for disorder control is clearly a critically important question. Chapter 12, "Control of Disorder," and the Supplement on Control of Disorder consider this question at length. We consider in this section the variety of control responses, official and unofficial, utilized in the 24 surveyed disorders, including:

- Use or threatened use of police force
- Use or threatened use of supplementary official force from other jurisdictions
- Negotiations between officials and representatives of the Negro community
- On-the-street persuasion by "counterrioters"

Disorders are scored as successful if they consisted of a succession of confrontations and withdrawal by two cohesive groups, the police or other control force on one side and a riotous mob on the other. Often it is assumed that there was no effort within the Negro
community to reduce the violence. Sometimes the only remedy prescribed is mobilization of the largest possible force or control force as early as possible.

Note: There are two views of violence. Sometimes it is declined in the sense of violence against property. Sometimes it is declined in the sense of violence against people.

Such substance was used to control or to control the disorder but not to control the violence. The result was the same when extra forces were mobilized before serious violence. In four cases where this was done, violence nonetheless occurred, in most cases more than once, and often of equal or greater intensity than before. The result was the same when extra forces were called, because the level and duration of violence were lower. In those cases where there was no violence, the next round was as in the cities which used outside forces.

Negotiation

In 21 of the 24 disturbances surveyed, discussion or negotiation occurred during the disturbance. There was an effort to negotiate or negotiate the issue. Some meetings were held immediately before or soon after the outbreak of violence. These meetings were held to prevent the disturbance from spreading. The result was the same when extra forces were called, because the level and duration of violence were lower. In those cases where there was no violence, the next round was as in the cities which used outside forces.

As in most other disturbances, there was an effort to negotiate or negotiate the issue. Some meetings were held immediately before or soon after the outbreak of violence. These meetings were held to prevent the disturbance from spreading. The result was the same when extra forces were called, because the level and duration of violence were lower. In those cases where there was no violence, the next round was as in the cities which used outside forces.

III. THE RIOT PARTICIPANT

It is sometimes assumed that the rioters were crimi-

nal types, envious social deviants, or riffraff—recent migrants, members of an understandably alienated group, or without social or political concerns. It is often implied that there was no effort within the Negro community to attempt to reduce the violence. We have obtained data on participation from four different sources:

1. Employer associations from more than 7,000 interviews in our staff reconnaissance survey of 20 cities.
2. Police reports on probability samples of riot area residents in the two May local police officers and members of the National Association of Negro Clergymen.
3. Arrest records from 22 cities, and

Only partial information is available on the total number of participants. In the Detroit survey, approximately 11 percent of the sampled residents over the age of 12 in the two disturbance areas participated in rioting; another 20 to 25 percent admitted to having been bystanders but declared that they had not participated; approximately 16 percent claimed they had engaged in counterriot activities; and the last proportion (40 to 50 percent) claimed that they were at home or elsewhere and did not participate.

However, a large proportion of the Negro community apparently believed that cops were gained than lost through rioting, according to the Nevell and Detroit survey.

Greater precision is possible in describing the characteristics of those who participated. We have com-

bined the data from the four surveys to construct a profile of the typical rioter and to compare him with the counterrioters and the nonparticipants.

THE PROFILE OF A RIOTER

The typical rioter in the summer of 1967 was a Negro male between the ages of 15 and 24. He was in many ways very different from the stereotype. He was not a migrant, as is commonly believed. He was born in the state and was a lifelong resident of the city in which he grew up. Economically his position was about the average inner-city Negro, having at least attended school for a time. Nevertheless, he was more likely to be working in a clerical or low status job as an unskilled laborer. If he was employed, he was not working full time and his employment was frequently interrupted by periods of unemployment.

He feels strongly that he deserves a better job and that he is denied access to achieving it, not because of lack of training, ability, or ambition, but because of discrimination by employers.

He rejects the whole bigot's stereotype of the Negro as ignorant and shiftless. He takes great pride in his race and believes that in some respects Negroes are superior to whites. He is extremely hostile to whites, but his hostility is more apt to be a product of social and economic class of race; in his own feelings.

Distinctive insignia were worn by the officially re-

ognized counter-rioters. In most cases, however, counter-rioters are known to have acted independently, without official recognition, in a number of cases.

Counterrioters generally included young men, min-

isters, community action agency workers, and well-known ghetto residents. Their usual technique was to work through the disturbance area urging people to "cool it," although they often took a more active as well as a more passive role.

How effective the counterrioters were is difficult to determine in cities where they knew that they believed they were helpful.
He is substantially better informed about politics than Negroes who were not involved in the riot. He is more likely to be actively engaged in civil rights efforts, but is extremely dissatisfied with the political system and political leaders.

**THE PROFILE OF THE COUNTERRIOTER**

The typical counterrioter, who risked injury and arrest to walk the streets urging rioters to "cool it," was an active supporter of existing social institutions. He was, for example, far more likely than either the rioter or the noninvolved to feel that this country is worth defending in a major war. His actions and his attitudes reflected his substantially greater stake in the social system; he was considerably better educated and more affluent than the rioter or the noninvolved. He was somewhat more like the rioter, but less like the noninvolved, who had been a migrant. In all other respects he was identical to the noninvolved.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS**

**Race**  
Of the arrestees 83 percent were Negroes; 15 percent were whites. Our interviews in 20 cities indicate that almost all rioters were Negroes.

**Age**  
The survey data from Detroit, the arrest records, and our interviews in 20 cities, all indicate that the rioters were younger and the noninvolved, older. In the Detroit survey, 61.3 percent of the self-reported rioters were in ages of 15 and 24, and 86.3 percent were between 15 and 35. The arrest data indicate that 52.3 percent of the arrestees were between 15 and 24, and 40.4 percent were between 15 and 35.

Of the noninvolved, by contrast, only 32.6 percent of the arrestees were between 15 and 24, and 58.3 percent were between 15 and 35.

**Sex**  
The single sources of available information—the Newark survey, the Detroit arrest study, and arrest records from four cities—indicate a tendency for rioters to be single. The Newark survey indicates that rioters were single—56.2 percent—more often than the noninvolved—49.6 percent.

The Newark survey also indicates that rioters were more likely to have been divorced or separated—14.2 percent—than the noninvolved—6.4 percent. However, the arrest records from four cities indicate only a very small percentage of those arrested fall into this category.

**Region of Upbringing**

Both survey data and arrest records demonstrate unequivocally that those brought up in the region in which the riot occurred are much more likely to have participated in the riot. The percentage of self-reported rioters brought up in the North is almost identical for the Detroit survey—74.7 percent—and the Newark survey—74 percent. By contrast, of the noninvolved, 38 percent in Detroit and 52.4 percent in Newark were brought up in the region in which the disorder occurred.

Data available from five cities on the birthplace of arrestees indicate that 63 percent of the arrestees were born in the North. Although birthplace is not necessarily identical with place of upbringing, the data are sufficiently similar to provide strong support for the conclusion.

Of the self-reported counterrioters, however, 47.5 percent were born in the North, according to the Detroit survey, a figure which places them in the middle of the self-reported rioters and the noninvolved. Apparently, a significant consequence of growing up in the South is the tendency toward noninvolvement in a riot situation, while involvement in a riot, either in support of or against existing social institutions, was more common among those born in the North.

**Residence**  
Rioters are not only more likely than the noninvolved to have been born in the region in which the riot occurred, but they are also more likely to have been long-time residents of the city in which the disturbance took place. The arrest survey data indicate that 59.4 percent of the self-reported rioters, but only 34.6 percent of the noninvolved, were born in the city. The comparable figures in the Newark survey are 53.5 percent and 22.5 percent.

Outsiders who temporarily entered the city during the riot might have left before the surveys were conducted and therefore may be underestimated in the

**Income**  
In the Detroit and Newark survey data, income level alone does not seem to correlate with self-reported riot participation. The figures from the two cities are not directly comparable since respondents were asked for individual income in Detroit and family income in Newark. More Detroit self-reported rioters (38.4 percent) had annual incomes under $5,000 per year than the noninvolved (30.1 percent), but even this small difference disappears when the factor of age is taken into account.

In the Newark data, in which the age distributions of self-reported rioters and the noninvolved are more similar, there is almost no difference between the rioters, 22.6 percent of whom had annual income under $5,000, and the noninvolved, 24.6 percent of whom had annual income under $5,000.

The similarity in income distribution should not, however, lead to the conclusion that more affluent Negroes are as likely to riot as poor Negroes. Both surveys were conducted in urban areas where incomes are considerably lower than in the city as a whole and the surrounding metropolitan area. Nevertheless, the data show that rioters are not necessarily the poorest of the poor.

While income fails to distinguish self-reported rioters from those who were not involved, it does distinguish counterrioters from rioters and the noninvolved. Less than 8 percent of both those who rioted and those not

**Unemployment**

Unemployment levels among both groups were extremely high. In the Detroit survey, 29.6 percent of the self-reported rioters were unemployed; in the Newark survey, 29.7 percent; and in the Detroit arrest survey, 21.8 percent. The unemployment rates for the noninvolved in the Detroit and Newark surveys were 31.5 and 19.0 percent.

Self-reported rioters were more likely to be only intermittently employed, however, than the noninvolved. Respondents in Newark were asked whether they had been unemployed for as long as one month or more during the last year. Sixty-one percent of the self-reported rioters, but only 45.4 percent of the noninvolved, answered "yes."